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INTRODUCTION 
Woodrow Wilson said on April 3, 1917, 
Does not every American feel that assurance has been 
added to our hope for the future peace of the world by 
the wonderful and heartening things that have been hap-
pening within the last few weeks in Russia? ••• Here 
is a fit partner for a League of Honor" (1:512). 
Wilson depicted in this statement the American reaction to 
the March Revolution in Tsarist Russia of 1917. The United 
States was about to enter the Great War where her main 
objectives would be to defeat Germany and save the world 
for democracy; the Russian Revolution represented to the 
United States a first movement toward the paramount goal 
of freeing the people of the world from the harsh rule of 
autocracyo 
This paper will study the relationship between the 
newly established Russian Provisional Government and the 
United States, March through November of 19170 The purpose 
of this study is to describe the diplomatic relations between 
the two governments and to illuminate the shortcomings of 
the United States in these relationso United States foreign 
policy in 1917 was primarily concerned with continuation of 
the war effort, and she pressed a war-weary Russian populace 
to keep fighting to save the intangible political ideal of 
democracy. The Russian people were reluctant to go on 
fighting a war to obtain the wartime goals of their deposed 
ruler and the Allies. These people did not look upon the 
defeat of German militarism as the sole means for saving 
the world for peace; they felt that the Allies themselves 
must repudiate all profits from a German defeat and dedi-
cate themselves to the emancipation of all the enslaved 
peoples of the world. The defeat of Germany was not the 
ultimate goal of the Russian peopleo The Woodrow Wilson 
administration, on the other hand, felt that Germany's 
defeat was the first and most important step to a peaceful 
world. Herein lies the basis for a misunderstanding; the 
hope of one to build a free nation, and the goal of the 
other to defeat German militarism. The attitude of the 
United States toward the Provisional Government developed 
from a misunderstanding of the events at that time and 
misinterpretation of the aspirations of the Russian people. 
This study will attempt to illuminate the misunderstanding. 
Few historians have taken the time to deal speci-
fically with relations between the United States and the 
Russian Provisional Government. Edward H. Carr, in his 
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four volume work, ! History .Q,f Russia: The Bolshevik ~­
lution, devotes only one chapter to the diplomacy between 
the two governments in question. Russian-American Relations, 
March, .12.11-March, 1920: Documents ~ Papers, compiled and 
edited by c. K. Cumming and Walter Wo Pettit is questionable 
as to its thoroughness because it was published in 1921, so 
few years after the Bolshevik Revolution. Materials avail-
able at that time were limited compared to that which is 
currently available. "The Review of Books" in the American 
Historical Review, January, 1921, was very critical of the 
Cummings work because of his selectiveness of documents; 
the over-emphasis on Raymond Robins' involvement reduced 
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the objectivity of the work (48:371-72). Since then, a 
three volume work, The Russian Provisional Government, .1211, 
covering Russian affairs more thoroughly, was written by 
Alexander Kerensky and Robert Paul Browder. 
Many monographs have been written about different 
aspects of this particular time in diplomatic history. A 
few were written by the actual participants, for example: 
David R. Francis' Russia From ~ American Embassy; One 
Hundred ~ Days by Edgar Sisson; The Catastrophe by 
Alexander Kerensky; and Henry P. Davison's ~American 
Red Cross in ~ Great War. 
Since the Second World War additional material has 
appeared, but the period of the Provisional Government is 
written only as a small part of a larger study, or as in 
the case of Alexander Kerensky's memoirs, given as a sub-
jective account of the actual events. Arno J. Mayer's 
Politics~ Diplomacy of Peacemaking, published in 1967, 
devotes just over three chapters to Russia of 1917 and 
handles related topics in a very objective fashion. The 
most popular work of this period is George F. Kennan's 
Soviet-American Relations, ~-1920, two volumes. Kennan 
felt that the weakness of the Russian Provisional Govern-
ment and its inability to continue the war effort should 
have awakened the United States to the realization of 
Russia's inadequacy as a good war partner. He continued 
by saying: 
Yet the fact is that neither of these realities was 
widely noted in the United States; it is, indeed, not 
an exaggeration to say that the policy of the United 
States government toward the Russian Provisional 
Government was founded largely on ignorance of both 
of them and on the hope that just the opposite would 
be the case: that Russia would evolve rapidly, that is, 
in the direction of democratic stability, and that she 
would continue to prosecute vigorously, as a loyal and 
enthusiastic member of the western coalition, the war 
against Germany. In these misunderstandings will be 
found the roots not only of much of the ineffectiveness 
of American policy toward the Provisional Government 
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but also of the difficulty experienced by many Americans 
at a later date in adjusting to the realities of Soviet 
power (29:12). 
This writer agrees with Mr. Kennan, but Mr. Kennan used 
this misunderstanding as a basis for the beginning of his 
two volume work on Soviet-American relations, excluding, 
except briefly in the first chapter, American relations 
with the Provisional Government. With the availability 
of State Department material in the National Archives, the 
Russian-United States war diplomacy of 1917 can be more 
clearly defined. 
The division of this paper will consist of five 
chapters followed by a brief summary. Chapter One is 
entitled "United States' Reaction to the March Revolution," 
and will include reactions from the State Department, pub-
lic opinion, and Russian opinion of their own events. The 
Second Chapter, "Diplomacy: April, May and June," will 
follow the development of usual diplomatic relations in a 
chronological manner. Chapter Three, "Special Missions to 
Russia," will deal with the United States' efforts through 
the use of special committees sent to Russia, to convince 
her to continue in the war, the most important and well 
known committee being the Root Mission, headed by Elihu 
Root. Chapter Four, "Diplomacy: July through October," 
will again explain development of the diplomatic relations 
during this time. The Fifth Chapter, "United States Reac-
tion to the November Revolution," will describe the initial 
reaction to the revolution and the general attitude toward 
the very early days of the Bolshevik government. 
Dates throughout this paper will be from the 
Gregorian calendar which was in use in the West in 1917. 
The old style Julian calendar which the Russians used was 
thirteen days behind the Gregorian. Spelling of Russian 
names will be the generally accepted American version. 
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CHAPTER I 
UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE MARCH REVOLUTION 
Diplomacy between countries is formulated by the 
leaders. Each leader is guided by his representatives in 
foreign countries who send reports back to their capitals 
for analysis. In the case of United States-Russian rela-
tions, the reports from the representatives of the United 
States in Russia, added to public opinion at home, helped 
President Woodrow Wilson formulate a basic attitude toward 
the Russian government founded in March, 1917. By March, 
he was drawing closer to committing the United States to 
join the Allies in the fight against Germany. The overthrow 
of Tsardom and the formation of the new Russian representa-
tive government were more compatible with President Wilson's 
pre-formed philosophy of eradicating imperialism from the 
capitalist system. 
In order to understand the United States' relations 
with the Russian Provisional Government, it is necessary to 
analyze briefly the man most responsible for the development 
of these relations: David R. Francis, the United States 
Ambassador to Petrograd. David Francis had a long history 
as a public servant: Mayor of St. Louis (1885-1889), Gov-
ernor of Missouri (1889-1893), Secretary of the Interior 
(1896-1897), and President of the Universal Exposition of 
1904, as well as having had a long career as a businessman. 
George Kennan was dubious about why Mr. Francis was selec-
ted (29:35); his experience in foreign affairs had not been 
evident previouslyo 
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When Ambassador Francis arrived at Petrograd, Russia, 
in 1916, he was greeted by Tsarist Russia with her expensive 
and royal atmosphere, something to which a Missouri boy was 
not accustomedo Francis' British and French counterparts 
were much more at home in the refinement of the Russian 
Court. One can scarcely wonder at Francis' boyish excite-
ment over being the first major Ambassador to recognize the 
newly created Provisional Government upon the fall of Tsar-
dom. Francis' close relationship with this government formed 
the foundation of United States-Russian relations from March 
through November of 1917. 
Continuing war brought internal disorder and econo-
mic crisis to Russia in March, 1917. The Tsar had proved 
to be an inadequate leader of Russiao Francis sent numerous 
telegrams to Secretary of State Robert Lansing describing 
the turmoil existing in Petrograd and throughout Russia. 
Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia, sup-
ported Francis' descriptions of the poor economic conditions 
and lack of government coordination in the war effort when 
he cabled the British Foreign Office (5:57). 
In his communications to Lansing, Francis described 
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the progress of the revolution and the way the Duma was able 
to wrestle control of the government from the Romanovs, the 
Russian Imperial family. The first telegrams from Ambassa-
dor Francis displayed very little emotion; they were mostly 
businesslike descriptions of the events as he saw them. 
On March 15, Roland s. Morris, United States representative 
in Sweden, cabled a copy of an official statement by the 
Russian Telegram Bureau accounting for the disruption in 
the Russian government. It explained that the Duma replaced 
the Imperial family as head of the government. The cable 
went on to say that life had almost returned to normal in 
Petrograd (61:861.00/275). Morris, having the advantage of 
viewing from afar, was better able to interpret objectively 
the internal chaos than Francis, who was directly involved. 
Prince Lvov was named to head the newly created 
Provisional Government as Minister of Interior and President 
of Ministers. Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov, a well-known 
Russian historian and statesman, headed the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas abdica-
ted the throne for himself and his young son in favor of 
his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Michael, 
however, refused to rule Russia, which left the Duma in 
control of establishing Russia's first representative 
government. Francis reported these events without fanfare, 
although he did mention that the Duma and committees of 
workingmen disagreed on the kind of government to be estab-
lished. 
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United States recognition of the Russian Provisional 
Government proved to be the highlight of David Francis' 
career as Ambassador to Russia. He was elated over being 
the first Ambassador to recognize the new government. This 
early emotional involvement caused Francis to feel he had 
to retain his faith in the Provisional Government, even 
when that faith was not warranted. On March 18, 1917, Mr. 
Francis requested permission from the State Department to 
be the first to recognize the Provisional Government. He 
claimed that this first recognition was important to help 
stabilize the new government and ensure its participation 
in the war. He went on to say: 
This revolution is the practical realization of that 
principle of Government which we have championed and 
advocated, I mean Government by consent of the gov-
erned. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral 
effect especially if given first (61:861.00/282). 
In later years, Francis re-enacted his role in the recog-
nition of the new government with great pride in the ovation 
he received at the recognition ceremony (18:110). Lansing 
wired back permission for Francis to extend United States 
formal recognition of the Russian Government and Francis 
acted immediately by meeting with Foreign Minister Milyukov 
at eleven a.m. on March 22. He emphasized to Lansing that 
he extended the recognition hours before the British and 
French. 
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British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, like Francis, 
was interested in immediate recognition of the Provisional 
Government, but he insisted that Milyukov give assurance of 
Russia's willingness to continue the war to a successful con-
clusion (5:90). Buchanan was much more cautious than Francis 
in his view of the new Russian Ministers; he felt that they 
would prove to be too weak and that the strong man needed for 
an efficient organization of the government was not to be 
found in the existing Ministry (5:108). As to the actual 
recognition of the government, Buchanan followed Francis by 
forty-eight hours. He mentioned that Francis was very proud 
of being the first to recognize the new government (5:91). 
Secretary of State Lansing and Ambassador Francis 
had been less than enthusiastic about the Romanov government. 
Lansing wrote President Wilson of his impression that the 
Russian Imperial Court had divided loyalties between the 
Allies and the Germans, as they were of German descent, and 
now the new government would be an Ally (61:861.00/273). 
Francis' support of the Provisional Government continued to 
grow partly because of his desire that the government be 
successful and partly to insure Russia's continuance in the 
war. He believed that the government was occupied by just 
and honest representatives of all the people who would 
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govern with compassion for freedom and democracy. Atrium-
phant ending to the war was the only way for the Russian 
experiment in democracy to survive. 
Socialist parties were strong in Russia at this 
time. Francis described the socialist demands as "rot" and 
simultaneously lauded the outstanding qualifications of the 
government ministers (18:70-71). Francis recognized the 
potential strength of the socialist element, but failed to 
see its direct threat to the Provisional Government and its 
eventual support from the Russian people. A strong social-
ist element in Russia was recognized by Roland Morris in 
Sweden. As early as March 24, 1917, he observed that embar-
rassment would befall the Allies if a socialist government 
was established in Russia. He even said that the Stockholm 
press was aware of the stronger socialist party in compe-
tition with a weaker Duma (63:861.00/300). Socialist power 
was evident by the number of established socialist parties, 
but they were not prepared in March for the sudden fall of 
the Tsarist monarchy. Many of the non-socialist groups had 
participated in the old government and were thus in a better 
position to take command of the new one. 
Conditions in Russia at the time of the March Revo-
lution were very confusing. Food was scarce in the cities, 
not because it was not available, but because the transpor-
tation system in Russia was so poorly organized that food 
could not be moved from the farms to the cities. Reports 
of rioting and land-grabbing were widespread. Even the 
troops were reported to be impatient to join in the free 
land grab. David R. Maggowan, the Vice-Consul in Moscow, 
reported that soldiers and workers were refusing in large 
numbers to return to the war front and to the factories, 
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and instead were increasing the danger of a debacle. A 
class struggle over the land question was eminent, advised 
Maggowan (63:861.00/337). Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, 
collaborated with the report of poor conditions concerning 
food and transportation in Russia (63:861.00/337). The 
American Consul in Petrograd, North Winship, reported the 
deteriorating conditions in Petrograd and the surrounding 
area. He warned that if the food problem was not relieved 
at once, the government would become more socialist (63: 
861.00/330). On March 27, he elaborated on the strength of 
the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputieso Soldiers 
refused to take orders from former Imperial officers and 
many workers abstained from working. They were interested 
in a speedy conclusion to the war (63:861.00/370). Despite 
the reports of confusion, the Russian populace generally 
supported the revolution and were helpful in overthrowing 
the Tsar. As time neared November, the workers and soldiers 
became disillusioned with the slowness of the revolution 
and again turned to violence as they had in July. 
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Looking through the eyes of David Francis, one 
sees a different picture of these conditions. Francis 
continued to send cables to Lansing reporting the improved 
conditions in Petrograd and the growing strength of the 
Provisional Government. He was concerned with two things: 
keeping Russia in the war, and improving the United States 
relationship with Russia. William Phillips, Assistant Sec-
retary of State, reported receiving a telegram from Francis 
saying that financial aid to Russia at this time would be 
a "master stroke" (69:861.51/129). Francis alluded to the 
potential danger of the socialist element, but concluded 
this message with a reassuring statement as to the improving 
conditions. Letters from Samuel Gompers and other labor 
leaders would be helpful in quieting the socialists, sug-
gested Francis (63:861.00/299). 
State Department reaction was generally based on 
communications from Franciso Although Morris and Winship, 
among others, frequently disagreed with Francis' descrip-
tions of Russia's internal conditions, the State Department 
continued to believe Francis and disregard the others. An 
overwhelming desire on the part of Wilson and Lansing to 
see the war concluded with a German defeat and a victory 
for democracy closed their eyes to the true picture of 
Russia. They misunderstood the deep wishes of the Russian 
people to stop a war they felt was a conflict between 
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imperialistic countries; the people wanted to turn to 
the century-late task of making secure their freedom and 
projected equality. Francis was delighted to gain impor-
tance in a country that had previously had little to offer 
American diplomatso This enchantment with the Provisional 
Government blinded him to existing conditions and allowed 
him to continue from March to November supporting the vari-
ous Provisional Governments despite the obviously growing 
anti-government feeling. The desire of the official United 
States government to secure Russia's perseverance in the 
war against German autocracy contributed to the eventual 
ascent of Bolshevism in Russia. 
Public reaction to the overthrow of Russia's monar-
chy was for the most part like that of the State Department: 
enthusiastic. The ~ York Times ran front page articles 
on March 16, telling of the revolutionary events. Their 
account runs parallel to Ambassador Francis' statement, 
reporting that Tsar Nicholas was a "man of excellent inten-
tions, but vacillating resolutions, 11 "the revolution was 
well prepared," and, "the city is now quiet and perfect 
order prevails" (41:16th/1,2). The Times emphasized that 
the newly created Russian government would not give Germany 
an advantage; the Russian people would want to maintain 
their freedom through a successful prosecution of the war. 
"It is only through victory that Russia's long sought prize 
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of access to unfrozen seas can be won" (41:16th/10). It 
was this statement of implied imperialistic gain through 
war that would later become a strong socialist argument for 
abandoning the war. 
Reactions from other news media were very similar 
to that of the ~ York Times. ~ World said the revolu-
tion marked the passing of an old regime, whereas the New 
York Tribune related that Russia would have a full consti-
tutional form of government with a military responsible to 
the citizenry (57:799-800). The unification of the Allied 
cause for democracy against Germany became evident, reported 
the Dallas News (15:885-86)0 
The view that the Russian March Revolution resulted 
in unity for the Allies and enlightened democratic govern-
ment for Russia was further popularized in periodical 
articles. "The revolution in Russia has given absolute 
guarantee of the unity of the Allied cause to the end," 
wrote the Nation (40:330). Paul Wharton, giving an eye-
witness account in the Atlantic Monthly, said, "I am happy, 
very happy, for I believe that one of the great spiritual 
victories of mankind has been won during this bewildering 
week." Mr. Wharton went on to say that Russia would be 
the center of culture of the future (75:30). After only 
one week of complete chaos and confusion, it seems rather 
optimistic to make the statement that Russia, a country 
locked in archaic autocracy for hundreds of years, would 
suddenly emerge as an enlightened cultural center. 
Few people saw doubt or evil in the March revolu-
tion; most were searching for a just reason to support the 
Allied cause. The fall of Russian autocracy, the only 
chink in the Allied political armor, gave the American 
people the needed impetus to join in the Allied cause for 
defeat of German militarism. There were some people, how-
ever, who doubted the success of the Russian revolution; 
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one such person was Alexander Petrunkevitch, zoologist and 
President of the Executive Committee of the Federation of 
Russian Organizations in America, an anti-Bolshevik organi-
zation. Writing in the Yale Review, Petrunkevitch expressed 
doubt as to whether the revolution had actually accomplished 
what appeared on the surface to be democracyo Revolutions 
take a long time, they are not concluded in a week, nor can 
one predict the outcome in so short a time. Mr. Petrunke-
vi tch went on to say the socialists looked upon the revolu-
tion as social rather than political; this was something 
most other observers failed to see or report. He pointed 
out that there was a need for all European countries to 
follow suit and change with the times lest they be left 
with "time-worn ideals" (46:838-855). America and the 
Allies were too busy rejoicing over the new-found justifi-
cation for a complete victory over Germany to heed the 
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warning of doubt concerning the claimed success of the 
Russian revolution. People wanted the revolution to be 
successful, and therefore refused to look beyond a very 
transparent framework of Russian democracy. Had the Allies 
realized the eventual danger in tying their cause to the 
Russian revolution and insisting on Russian continuance in 
that cause, they might have taken an alternate path to 
Germany's ruin. 
Optimism regarding the Russian revolution continued 
with confidence invested in Prince Lvov. He was claimed to 
be the most popular man in Russia; in fact he was the only 
man the Russians were willing to trust as leader of the new 
governmento The New York Times reported that in the first 
week, the Tsar's name was deleted from church services 
(41:3). Gerald Morgan wrote in the North American Review 
that the war was a war for the people, not for nationalis-
tic interests nor dynasties; thus he supplemented the New 
York Times' article in showing the growing rejection of 
Tsarist ways (36:502-10). G. J. Sosnowsky, an American 
citizen, was not to be outdone when he said that Russia 
was to become "the world's foremost democracy" (52:536). 
This short review of articles on Russia's revolution shows 
only a few opinions on the subject. Many other people 
had their say concerning the Russian events, including 
Jews, newspaper editors, the general public and Congress. 
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Reluctance to give wholehearted support was the 
character of those few people that uttered words of caution 
about Russia. The "wait and see" attitude was the most 
popular view among the so-called opposition. Very few 
people in America understood the meaning and desires of 
the socialist parties in Russia; consequently their view 
was limited to past history. However, H. W. Nevinson, 
writing in Contemporary Review, did warn that danger might 
arise from the non-compromising principles of political 
theory inherent in the radical socialist parties such as 
the Social Democrats (39:409-18). The New Republic was more 
candid in its belief that Russia was a giant, free to wander 
in Asia without restraint. It even suggested that a defeated 
Germany would be unable to deter Russia from advancing into 
Western Europe (33:214-15). Dr. A. Coralnik, American corre-
spondent of the Bourse Gazette of Petrograd, disagreed with 
the New Republic's view of an unrestrained Russiao He saw 
Russia as a peace-loving democracy with nothing to demand 
of her neighbors (41:25th/E-2). Fear that the revolution 
was far from over existed among some people, noted the ~ 
~Times (41:17th/3). Again these views were not typical; 
rather, they displayed the lack of unquestioned confidence 
exhibited by the general public. 
Of all the interest groups in the United States, the 
Jews probably had more direct interest in the revolution 
than anyone. For years the Jews had been discriminated 
against under Tsarist rule, and as a result, many fled to 
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the United States. Naturally they felt a keen interest and 
delight at the fall of the Romanovs. The Jews viewed the 
revolution as a liberal movement and thought their position 
in Russia and throughout the world would be advanced. The 
~ York Times reported a mass meeting of Jewish refugees to 
cheer the new government, for which 8,000 tickets had been 
sold (41:20th/2). Herman Berstein, editor of The American 
Hebrew, conveyed that the revolution could possibly result 
in the "eventual building up of a great empire of the 
people," meaning Jews (41:16th/4). Many Jewish refugees 
would turn to Russia upon hearing the news of the revolu-
tion, said Dr. Israel Friedlander, professor of Biblical 
Literature at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America 
(41:25th/E-3)o Abraham Cahan, editor of the Jewish Daily 
Forward, wrote, "We no longer distinguish between the Rus-
sian government and the Russian people; both are one in soul 
and spirit: we now love both" (17:15-16). Jewish enthusiasm 
was great indeed; it is understandable to rejoice and see 
only the good when viewing the fall of an enemy. Neverthe-
less, this did not excuse the failure of the Jewish community 
to realize that pogroms in Russia needed the active support 
from many people outside of the government. The collapse of 
a government does not cleanse away basic feelings and 
prejudices of people; they remain, latent though they may 
be, to become active at a later date. 
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Editorial comments in the highly respected New~ 
Times gave evidence of wishful thinking rather than schol-
arly analysis. On March 24, eight days after Tsar Nicholas 
abdicated, the Times said in an editorial that the Russian 
Church called for the people to be loyal to the government. 
The Times claimed this was a good sign, and went further by 
saying that the socialists in Russia were "an insignificant 
fraction of the population" (41:23rd/8). Both statements, 
in light of future events, proved to be naive at best. An 
editorial in The Independent was more cautious, but con-
cluded that the results of the revolution would be permanent, 
meaning Tsardom was to be no more (56:525). 
By no means were the New York Times editors guilty 
of perpetrating a false view to the public, because the 
public had already drawn the same enthusiastic opinion of 
the revolutiono Individual travelers in Russia brought back 
the view that the Russian army was in complete support of 
the new government. To add to the already glazed public 
conception of the revolution, a United States government 
economic advisor and member of the Institute of Government 
Research, N. I. Stone, Ph.D., claimed that the Russian 
people were basically a democratic people. He said that 
Russia was "ripe for a republican form of government" in 
comparison to past revolutionary countries (41:25th/2). 
Simon Bass represented public reaction by writing to the 
~York Times that America should be happy for Russia's 
new opportunity for freedom and to thank the Times for 
bringing the public the good news (41:22nd/10). 
The State Department was not without a share of 
public opinion of the March Revolution. Many cables and 
letters were received indicating individual and group 
excitement over the revolution. Some went so far as to 
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send congratulatory letters to the new government in Russia. 
Typical among the reactions received by the State Depart-
ment was Oscar s. Straus' thanks to Secretary Lansing for 
seeing that the United States was the first to recognize 
the newsly created Russian government (63:861.00/314). The 
State Department forwarded some of the reactions to Ambassa-
dor Francis for further distribution in appropriate Russian 
circles. 
Congress was not to be outdone by the public nor 
the State Department in their joyous acceptance of the new 
democracyo Action taken by Congress was very limited, which 
is understandable since the State Department handles most 
foreign relations matters. A few resolutions passed both 
Houses congratulating the Russian people and promising bro-
therly help when needed. Isaac Siegel, in answer to the 
pacifists' opposition in the United States, read George 
Kennan's (relative of George F. Kennan) statement that 
America should now join the Allies and fight for freedom 
in Europe. Kennan said liberty in Russia was not won by 
pacifists, nor would be European liberty (7:1035). 
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Bankers sensed a new market in Russia for money 
dealings. Most bankers were excited over the new, basi-
cally untouched money market. Loans to the new Russian 
government would be made more readily availableo Some 
bankers were hesitant to float loans at first, or at least 
until the government took on a more stable character (41: 
17th/16). Nevertheless, bankers seemed to be in general 
agreement that Russia provided a largely untapped economic 
sourceo Even though this first reaction was optimistic for 
Russia, it did not materialize in large loans for her in the 
remaining time before the Bolshevik takeover. 
For the most part, the American reaction to the 
Russian revolution was enthusiastic and supporting. On the 
contrary, the Russians were less enthusiastic, and in many 
cases, gave only qualified support. Naturally there were 
those who considered the Provisional Government a godsend, 
but many took the "wait and see" attitudeo The socialist 
parties in general were not opposed to the new government, 
but they recommended that their followers only support those 
governmental programs that were consistent with party policy. 
Lenin led the anti-government forces with his April 
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thesis: no support to the Provisional Government. At this 
time, however, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were not in.fluential 
compared to the much larger and more popular groups of 
Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Lenin said the gov-
ernment still had imperialistic aspirations of territorial 
gain (4:1203). Izvestiia, organ of the Workers' and Sol-
dier's Deputies, represented the most powerful organized 
group in Petrograd, and their support, badly needed by the 
government, was qualified. At first they refused to sanction 
fellow socialists joining the Provisional Government; later 
they relented and let them join but only after creating a 
committee "to watch over the acts of the Provisional Govern-
ment" (4:125-26). Four days later, on March 20, they called 
for the Russian people to continue to agitate and keep the 
revolution going (4:195). The underlying idea to this was 
that the people, not the Provisional Government, must con-
tinue the re-organization of Russia and control their own 
futures. An editorial in Den, a socialist newspaper, said 
they would oppose any "Chauvinistic, nationalistic, and 
imperialistic words, thoughts, or deeds" from any source. 
They did give support to the Provisional Government; how-
ever, they retained the right to criticize any wrong acts 
of the government (4:144). Other newspapers, such as the 
Rabochaia Gazeta, of the Social Democratic Party (Menshevik), 
and the Delo Naroda, of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 
said they would support the Provisional Government as long 
as it agreed with their actions. 
There were those, such as the conservative paper 
Novoe Vremia, who gave unqualified support to the Provi-
sional Government. It said as early as March 18 that the 
newly created government was "the legitimate expression of 
the entire people's will" (4:141). "Izvestiia" Revoliut-
sionnoi Nedeli, not to be confused with Izvestiia, called 
for governmental support by the people to aid the success 
of the revolution (4:136). ~' organ of the Constitu-
tional Party Democrats, gave its support to the government 
and called the revolution the eighth wonder of the world 
(4:143). 
The Provisional Government had an enormous task 
ahead of itself uniting all of Russia's people, and the 
war with Germany was just an added problem with which to 
contend. Rather than withdraw from the war, its biggest 
problem, the Provisional Government chose to dedicate 
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itself to a more vigorous prosecution of the war and to 
bring it to a prompt and just conclusion. The government 
made its aims public on March 20 in the !o y. ~o' the 
government newspaper, declaring, 11 the Government will make 
every effort to provide our army with everything necessary 
to bring the war to a victorious conclusion" (4:157). Reac-
tion of the various interest groups in Russia was along 
party lines. The strongly socialist groups tended to 
oppose the continuation of the war; some said that if the 
war must be continued, then eliminate the imperialistic 
goals. Conservative parties were in favor of supporting 
the Allied cause; the Cadets called for government support 
to repel the external enemy (4:1199). 
Support of the Provisional Government was not 
always contingent on the composition of the government, 
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but rather on its stand on certain key problems existing 
within Russia. One such problem was moneyo The government 
needed the cooperation of the manufacturers, whereas the 
socialist elements were demanding more control of factories 
by the workers. Another issue was the association of the 
Church with the State; Izvestiia was quite emphatic in 
insisting that there be a complete separation of Church and 
State (4:812). Some Americans were pleased when the Russian 
Churches supported the Provisional Government, thinking the 
churches represented popular opinion. 
Probably the most applause the Provisional Govern-
ment received in its short life was for the abolishment of 
the death penalty for military crimes. The newspapers rang 
with praise for the government for eliminating an old Tsar-
ist tool. This act proved to be dangerous and the penalty 
was eventually restored with the agreement of Ambassador 
Fra:nciso 
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Alexander Kerensky re-wrote his memoirs in 1965, 
Russia and History's Turning Point, in which he expressed 
strong feelings concerning the first moments of the Provi-
sional Government. He described the immediate confusion 
and physical reaction of the public upon receiving the news 
of the fall of the Tsar. At first the people reacted vio-
lently against old Tsarist officials and landlords, but 
Kerensky said they ceased this disruptive behavior when all 
Russia realized that the fall of the Tsar meant the reali-
zation of a life-long dream--freedom (30:218). 
With the forming of the Provisional Government, 
Kerensky was the only socialist appointed to the Ministry. 
His first-hand experience in the early days of the revolu-
tion gave him an insight to the government that no other 
person could claim. Prince Lvov, the President of the 
first Ministry, had been criticized for being weak; however, 
Kerensky defended him as having complete faith in Russia's 
capacity to develop a democracy (30:220). 
Kerensky wrote that the Russian people turned to 
the task of building a new life with great enthusiasm 
(30:230). He was confident in the people's capacity to 
withstand all the pressures brought to bear as a result of 
the years of political inactivity. This was evidenced by 
the government's inclusion of a variety of political par-
ties in the Ministry. Kerensky was concerned because the 
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Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies had reservations 
about endorsing any Cabinet members but Kerensky as Minister 
of Justice. This showed the potential danger to the Provi-
sional Government which proved to be an unfortunate reality 
(30:234). 
Kerensky felt the Provisional Government had four 




1) To continue the defense of the country; 
( ) To reestablish a working administrative appara-
tus throughout the country; 
(3) To carry out a number of basic political and 
social reforms; 
(4) To prepare the way for the transformation of 
Russia from a highly centralized state into a federal 
state (30:219). 
Making the war the government's top priority was a mistake. 
Kerensky still believes, however, as he related in his mem-
oirs, that the government was generally popular and had the 
interests of the people at heart. He also believed that 
the people, for the most part, supported the government. 
The socialist parties gave their support to the 
government as long as it followed their ideas; the Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Soviet announced at the beginning that they 
were not going to follow the government blindly and that 
drastic changes must be made before Russia could hope to 
attain a democratic state. If the war must be continued, 
then all imperialistic war aims must be renounced, insisted 
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many socialist newspapers. This needed change was never 
fully recognized by United States authorities. By November, 
the cry for Russian withdrawal from the war grew louder, 
while the American effort to keep Russia fighting became 
more intense. The rest of this paper will deal with United 
States attempts to keep Russia in the war despite the logic 
against such a course of action. 
CHAPTER II 
DIPLOMACY: APRIL, MAY AND JUNE 
During a three month period, April, May and June, 
the Russian Provisional Government had great difficulties 
maintaining stability and seeking cooperation among the 
political parties in Russia. The government was lacking 
a leader. Alexander Kerensky was slow in moving up the 
ladder of governmental importance, and at this time he was 
not able to exercise the degree of guiding leadership that 
was needed in that time of turmoil. 
Using the Russian Revolution as a final justifica-
tion for United States entrance to the World War, Woodrow 
Wilson committed himself and the country to encouraging 
Russian efforts against Germany. He wanted the Allies to 
win a victory for democracy and everlasting peaceo As a 
result, most United States government officials were so 
busy trying to keep Russia fighting that they were blind 
to the internal disorder and public dissatisfaction with 
the entire war. The socialists were able to capitalize on 
this unrest among the people; when the Provisional Govern-
ment insisted on continuing the war, they presented the 
side of the people. This period, April through June, was 
the beginning of the United States misunderstanding of the 
Russian people's desire to conclude the war, or else to 
repudiate the imperialistic goals of the Allies. 
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The first move the Provisional Government had to 
make to continue the war effort and maintain general sta-
bility was to secure a large loan from the United States. 
Ambassador Francis was very anxious to assist the govern-
ment in its efforts. He wired Secretary of State Lansing 
that since the United States had loaned five hundred mil-
lion dollars to both France and Great Britain, the Russians 
would be insulted if they were not given the same amount. 
Francis assured Lansing that Russia was abundantly rich in 
natural resources so the loan would be "absolutely safe" 
(69:861.51/133). Within seven days, on April 13, Secretary 
of the Treasury William McAdoo, via Lansing, assured Francis 
that Congress would approve loans for those countries will-
ing to continue the fight against the common enemy (69: 
861051/133). He was saying that if Russia did not fight, 
she would not receive financial aid from the United States. 
Russia's need for money or credit was painfully 
obvious. Her railroad system was confused for the most 
part, but more important, she was lacking locomotives and 
boxcars. The government had also been trying desperately 
to buy guns from the Remington Company, but did not have 
adequate credit. Francis talked to the Russian Minister 
of Finance on April 20 and told him no loans would be 
forthcoming unless the Russians continued to fight. The 
Minister agreed that there would be no separate peace 
(69:861.51/134)0 
Discussions concerning American loans to Russia 
continued for the remaining seven months with Francis pro-
mising the State Department that Russia was quite capable 
of paying back a loan. The Treasury Department finally 
secured the loan and authorized Russian credit in the 
United States up to one hundred million dollars. Francis 
reported that the Minister of Finance feared the United 
States would loan money to Russia through Great Britain, 
and he said the Russians would be insulted if this were 
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the case (69:861.51/140). Finally, the United States con-
tinued to push Francis to inform the Provisional Government 
that the loan was contingent on their continued war effort. 
It is interesting to note that North Winship, 
United States Consul in Petrograd, said the Russian people 
had no faith in their economy; the people were trying des-
perately to sell all possessions. Winship felt that a loan 
was needed to prevent economic chaos rather than preserve 
the fighting force (63:861.00/439,435). 
The Petrograd Soviet debated long and hard whether 
to back the government's bid for the American Liberty Loan; 
with reluctance, they finally agreed to support the govern-
mento Once again, the Soviet hesitated to uphold the Allies 
because of their imperialistic war aims. Their consent to 
the loan was to aid the government to throw off the bonds 
of imperialism and seek only revolutionary objectives. 
Money was borrowed, stated the Provisional Govern-
ment, to aid in defeating Germany; the responsibility of 
every citizen was to help in this effort (4:486). ~' a 
socialist newspaper, said the loan was only good as long 
as the government realized that annexations were out of 
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the question (4:486). Again, the Russian attention focused 
on the Allied war objectives; dissatisfaction with these 
objectives was strong in the socialist parties, but little 
was done by the United States to calm this unrest. 
The American view of the Provisional Government and 
its degree of popular support was developed by Ambassador 
Francis. He continued to send back reports telling of the 
improved conditions and of the many people who spoke of sup-
porting the Provisional Government. He described the enthu-
siastic crowds that gathered at the American Embassy and his 
patriotic speeches to them. Although Francis rarely studied 
the socialist mind and never tried to understand the desires 
of those seeking a separate peace, he did find time to dis-
cuss opposition to the Bolshevikso Winship reported on 
April 30 that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers• Deputies 
strongly denounced Lenin, the Bolshevik leader; they believed 
he was dangerous to their membership (63:861.00/386). This 
certainly satisfied Francis and indicated that the most 
powerful Soviet in Russia supported the governmento 
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It appears that the State Department's view of the 
popularity of the Provisional Government was fairly accurate 
because most Petrograd papers pleaded at the beginning for 
government support from the people. Even Izvestiia, tool of 
the Workmen's and Soldiers• Soviet, called for the people to 
uphold the government for fear that opposition would cause 
riots and disorder that might lead to the end of the Revo-
lution (4:1241). Izvestiia asked the soldiers not to carry 
their weapons during the June demonstration (4:1323). There 
was criticism, much of the time, concerning the Bolsheviks 
and their aspirations of complete government control. The 
government continued to receive backing from the non-
socialist parties as long as they carried on an aggressive 
military campaign against Germany. 
Support of the Provisional Government diminished 
as the months passed. Each party had its own "ax to grind," 
and the government appeared to be the grinding wheel. North 
Winship, Consul in Petrograd, reported that the people were 
in strong opposition to the way the government was handling 
the war. Many protested the offensive against Germany; 
others rebelled against the war and cried for an end to the 
fighting. Winship described newspaper articles telling the 
people the only way that land reform and other revolutionary 
ideas could be accomplished was for the war to end (63: 
861.00/435). Some papers even accused Alexander Kerensky, 
Acting Minister of War, of fighting on the offensive, in 
essence, causing the war to spread and postponing the day 
of peace (63:861000/435). 
Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, sent to Washing-
ton a copy of an open letter to Frank L. Polk, Assistant 
Secretary of State, from a Petrograd official criticizing 
the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for accusing non-
governmental backing by the people (63:861.00/403!). Ano-
ther Consulate, John A. Ray in Odessa, reported that the 
peasants were not supporting the government. He said the 
peasants had deserted the Zemstvo organizations--formerly 
the main representative body in the rural areas--because 
the land owners controlled them. Many peasants were form-
ing their own organizations in opposition to the Zemstvos 
(63:861.00/401). Ray pointed out later that many of the 
regions were calling for local autonomy and independence 
(63:861.00/410)0 
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Reports continued to come into the State Department 
from Russia describing the deteriorating conditions. They 
explained how the socialist elements were becoming more 
aggressive toward the government. The workers were making 
excessive demands of their employers and refusing to work 
unless their demands were met. The government was almost 
powerless to meet this resistance with concentrated 
authority; one reason for this weakness was the lack of 
socialist ministers. Only Alexander Kerensky served in 
the government from the powerful Council of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies; the Council was opposed to any 
other members joining the government (63:861.00/404), thus 
perpetrating the division of power within Russia. Even 
Kerensky admitted in 1927 that the open hatred of Minister 
Milyukov by the Petrograd Soviet was detrimental to the 
government's existence and showed the "lack of confidence" 
in the government. This confidence had to be restored if 
the government could hope to survive (31:132-33). 
To make matters worse, the Bolsheviks were plan-
ning a mass demonstration against the government in June. 
Lenin had arrived in Russia two months earlier, in April, 
and had been preaching to the workers to agitate against 
the existing government whenever possible; he appealed to 
the workers to elect their own kind to office and help end 
the war. The cry for a mass demonstration was made on 
June 10 by a Bolshevik bulletin calling for soldiers and 
workers to join hands and support their local Soviets. 
35 
They used the slogan "Bread! Peace! Liberty!" to good advan-
tage (4:1312). The Petrograd Soviet was in opposition to 
the Bolsheviks, and they pleaded for the workers to avoid 
demonstrations, especially armed demonstrations (4:1313). 
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Antagonism toward the government mounted steadily 
month after month as the war grew and Allied pressure to 
continue fighting grew more intense. The war played a major 
role, if not ~ major role, in the eventual collapse of the 
Provisional. Government. 
President Woodrow Wilson developed his international 
political. philosophy prior to the first Russian Revolution 
in 1917. He was concerned with the existing world unrest, 
and, as he indicated in his famous Fourteen Point speech on 
January 8, 1918, he wished to see order result from the 
European conflict. N. Gordon Levin devoted the first two 
chapters in Woodrow Wilson~ World Politics to the idea 
that President Wilson was basically anti-imperialist and 
hoped to change existing European imperialist goals by reform 
rather than revolution. According to Levin, Wilson justified 
the war against Germany as a war of liberal reform. In other 
words, if Germany was defeated, imperialism would be weak-
ened and a progressive attitude toward international rela-
tions would emerge, led by the omnipotent United States 
economic power. Therefore, when the Russian Revolution 
created a liberal form of government in Petrograd, it gave 
Wilson the final reason to implement his international phi-
losophy, to assist a liberal Russia in her fight against 
imperialism (32:Ch. I,II). 
Robert Lansing also saw the connection between the 
Revolution and the American crusade to save the world for 
democracy. Woodrow Wilson included Russia in his war 
address when he said: 
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Does not every American feel that assurance has been 
added to our hope for the future peace of the world by 
the wonderful and heartening things that have been hap-
pening within the last few weeks in Russia? ••• Here 
is a fit partner for a League of Honor (1:512). 
Subsequently, the United States embarked on one of his-
tory's most famous crusades. One hardly has to wonder why 
Russia's continuance in the war was so important to the 
United States: Russia represented the new democracy, the 
embryo of a new world of peace and freedom led by the 
greatest democracy of them all--the United States. David 
R. Francis and many other Americans were so caught up in 
the fast pace of saving the world that they did not have 
time to analyze situations and determine whether each 
country wanted to be "saved" by the United States. 
The Provisional Government policy was made public 
on April 9, declaring that Russia would work closely with 
the Allies and seek a just peace with no annexations and 
with "self-determination of peoples" (4:1046). Iv'Iilyukov's 
successor, Minister Terestchenko, reiterated these govern-
mental objectives on several occasions. He emphasized that 
Russia would not seek a separate peace; this was most 
gratifying to Ambassador Francis, who was in daily contact 
with Terestchenko. As expected, the right-wing newspapers 
supported the government's announcement. 
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The army was not as zealous as the government. Mad-
din Summers reported newspaper articles in Moscow described 
the poor conditions and morale in the army, and said that 
reinforcement troops for the front lines were deserting en 
masse (63:861.00/406)0 A. F. Kerensky, the new Minister of 
War and Navy, made an emotional appeal on May 25 to the sol-
diers to continue fighting and save the revolution (4:936). 
Many newspapers in Petrograd supported Kerensky's call for a 
new June offensiveo There was disagreement as to who should 
control the offensive; the military interest pressured the 
government for control, and this resulted in a certain 
amount of confusion. Roland Morris in Sweden related Prince 
Lvov's request that the Provisional Government be given full 
control of the army if they were expected to be responsible 
for the well being of the country (63:861.00/355). This 
disruption and confusion about the control of the army 
continued until the Bolsheviks took over in November. Disci-
pline was almost non-existent in the army; the men in the 
ranks demanded new powers over their officers as guaranteed 
by the revolution. This helped feed the disruptive confu-
sion and led to inadequate execution of duties. 
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President Wilson sent messages to Russia on dif-
ferent occasions explaining that this was not a war for 
territorial or monetary gain, but for saving democracyo 
Russia was very important to the war, said Colonel Edward 
House, friend and confidant of Wilson's; and the United 
States could not spend enough to help her (50:25). Wilson's 
interest in Russia was evidenced by his actions toward the 
socialistso He refused to stop the socialists in the United 
States from attending a gathering in Stockholm, and in addi-
tion, he used his position to try to influence a court case 
in California involving a socialist, Thomas Jo Mooney, who 
had allegedly thrown a bomb during a Preparedness Day parade 
on July 22, 1916. Wilson told California Governor William 
D. Stephens that a sentence commuted to life would aid the 
United States internationally (1:65-66). Wilson never 
really displayed much understanding of the Russian social-
ist movement, nor did many Americans. 
Propaganda played a positive role in United States-
Russian relations; the United States sent missions, films, 
and other forms of informational propaganda to Russia. 
Secretary Lansing and Ambassador Francis were in agreement 
to encourage President Wilson to continue distributing 
information to Russia. Francis frequently asked for clari-
fication of United States war aims and for statements from 
the President to encourage the Russian government to fight 
on. The aforementioned individual missions will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
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Propaganda, intentional or otherwise, did not stop 
with the State Department; many private citizens sent 
letters to Russia and called for films depicting the United 
States efforts to help mankind. Most of these offers, how-
ever, were channelled through the State Department. Labor 
leader Samuel Gompers wrote to ~"'rancis, saying that the 
American workers were rejoicing because their Russian 
counterparts had finally attained freedom. But he warned 
that it was impossible to achieve all goals immediately 
(63:861.00/389). Another example of private citizen ini-
tiative was H. M. Edmunds, who requested permission from 
President Wilson to show movies in Russia depicting German 
mistreatment of Russian soldiers (67:861.4061/3). Many 
other examples may be cited, but let it suffice to say 
that many Americans were involved in encouraging Russia 
to remain in the war--whether she wanted to or not. 
The socialists viewed the war with far less enthu-
siasm than the Provisional Government or the United States. 
In fact, the socialists read into President Wilson's mes-
sages the approval of annexations and other imperialistic 
attitudes. North Winship reported that the Social Democrats 
(Maximalist) claimed Allied war aims in "absolute opposition" 
to the Russian war aims (63:861.00/438). From Odessa, John 
A. Ray pointed out that when the United States entered the 
war, the Russians lost faith in Wilson's objectivity (63: 
861000/446). More importantly, the strongest opposition 
to the Provisional Government, the Council of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies, was emphatic in refuting Wilson 
and the Russian government. They said the socialist move-
ment was growing throughout the world and the only way for 
victory was a united struggle of working men against impe-
rialism (63:861.00/438). The desire for a separate peace 
or a change in the Allied war aims was presented to the 
State Department, but it refused to act in the face of 
the contradicting reports from Francis and others to come. 
David Francis, for the most part, reported the 
internal conditions of Russia to be improving. He held 
daily conferences with Provisional Government officials 
and seemed to be convinced by their reports, as he always 
concluded that conditions were improving. At one time, 
in a letter to Foreign Minister Milyukov on April 15, he 
went so far as to claim that Russia had always been demo-
cratic at heart (18:96-97). 
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Russia, 
took a much more pessimistic view of the Provisional Gov-
ernment. He did not see the basic Russian desire for 
democracy as did Francis, nor did he see any substantial 
reason for a Russian offensive in the spring (5:113-14). 
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In writing to the British Foreign Office, Buchanan said he 
could not share the same confidence in the Russian Ministry 
that Francis indicated in his letters to Lansing (5:115). 
According to Buchanan, the Germans proved to be a nearly 
insurmountable foe for the weak and disorganized Russian 
armyo At this point in time, April, 1917, Buchanan and 
Francis represented opposite Allied views of the Provi-
sional Government. North Winship, Roland Morris and Maddin 
Summers agreed with Buchanan, seeing the government as less 
than adequate. 
One of the most pressing problems of the Provisional 
Government was that of land reform. The peasant had the 
bonds of serfdom lifted fifty-six years earlier, but what 
good was their freedom without land? The immediate reac-
tion of the peasants to the downfall of the Tsarist monarchy 
was to grab and divide the land of the large estate owners. 
The Provisional Government delayed this action by promising 
that the proposed Constitutional Assembly would deal equi-
tably with the land question; but patience had been worn 
thin by years of waitingo Izvestiia was critical of the 
government's nebulous statements concerning land; it called 
for an affirmative stand on the problem (4:527). Winship 
reported in these early days, on April 17, that the peasants 
were very restless concerning the slowness of the government 
to act on the land question (63:861.00/404). The situation 
grew more tense as the days passed. By April 21, the gov-
ernment finally had to act, not to help the peasants, but 
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to inform the troops that they would have to use force 
against the peasants who were taking land illegally (4:584). 
This land problem continued to plague the infant democracy 
until its deatho The procrastination of the government in 
convening the Constitutional Assembly to deal with Russia's 
multitude of unique problems stands out as one of the major 
errors of the Provisional Government. The people were hun-
gry for a new life--to have to wait again proved to be too 
heavy a load for the people to bear. 
May saw a new governmental crisis: public pressure 
forced some of the Cabinet Ministers to resign. Francis 
recognized that the government was experiencing grave dif-
ficulties as he reported to Lansing different accounts of 
disorder from American diplomats in Russia (63:861.00/363). 
Unless the government could guarantee that the Russian army 
was willing and able to fight, ~rancis told the Foreign 
Minister, then he would recommend that all material support 
from America be withdrawn (63:861.00/343). 
The internal conditions of Russia in May were bad 
at best, and American representatives other than Francis 
wired Lansing of the confusion within the country. Maddin 
Summers was especially candid in his lengthy discussion 
about the inadequate education of the Russian masses to 
prepare them for a democratic government. He went on 
to explain some of the dangers to which these peasant 
Russians were exposed, but concluded they were generally 
too ignorant to understand or fear them (63:861.00/406). 
North Winship continued his portrait of a society riddled 
with anarchy when he related that burglaries and thefts 
had increased considerably during May (63:861.00/402). 
Reports from Roland Morris in Stockholm and John Ray in 
Odessa, said almost the same thing about poor conditions. 
Even The Outlook wrote on May 23 that because of her poor 
internal conditions, there was the real threat of Russia 
making a separate peace with Germany (54:131-32). 
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Deteriorating and harsh conditions within Russia 
did not go unnoticed in the Russian newspapers. Delo 
Naroda claimed the Russian economy was almost a complete 
wreck; the paper called for cooperation from all peoples to 
stabilize the situation (4:630). 
Land reform was an even greater problem in May 
than it was in April. Prince Lvov declared that land 
reform would be carried out by the Constitutional Assem-
bly, and told the soldiers at the front not to worry 
because land would not be distributed until they were 
present. He explained further that the study was being 
conducted to determine the best way to divide the land 
(4:527-28). This governmental directive was met by a 
retort from the peasant paper, Delo Naroda, saying that 
the peasants, workers and soldiers were in reality the 
governing bodies of Russia (4:534). 
As viewed by the United States, the condition of 
the Russian army in this general period, April, May and 
June, was far below acceptable standardso Reports were 
received by the State Department declaring the Russian 
army unfit to carry on the war. Reporting from Odessa, 
John Ray observed that the troops were highly susceptible 
to German propaganda, and war weariness made fraternizing 
with the enemy much easier (63:861.00/401). In another 
report, he described the lack of discipline in the army; 
the troops refused to obey their officers (63:861.00/436). 
Winship declared it was obvious to him that the govern-
ment had no control over the Petrograd troops (63:861.00/ 
393). Other American diplomats had comments to make on 
the worsening conditions within the army. Even Francis, 
who received much of this same information and was aware 
of the problem, insisted that stronger discipline within 
the army would improve conditions. 
Status and condition of the army continued to be 
a problem until the end of the Provisional Government. 
The Minister of War told Winship that the situation in 
the army was very serious (63:861.00/393); the officers 
were failing to keep control of the military machine. 
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The Russian newspapers tended to agree on the deplorable 
conditions within the army. Sir George Buchanan explained 
that the common soldiers could no longer identify with 
the war; fighting for the capitalists was no different 
from fighting for the Tsar (5:128). The Russians could 
see little to gain from this war between imperialists. 
They would prefer to go home and settle on their share 
of land. 
Socialist parties in Russia were rapidly gaining 
strength in the early months of the Provisional Govern-
ment. The main organizational body of the socialists 
was the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; but included 
in that group was the most radical of all socialists--
according to Francis--the Bolsheviks and their leader, 
Vladimir I. Lenin. Francis wrote to his son Perry, tell-
ing him of an "ultra-Socialist" that was inciting people 
to violence (18:106). He admitted in later years that 
he predicted Bolshevism would create "worldwide danger" 
(18:vi)o This is not to say, though, that Francis had 
pre-judged Lenin or turned a deaf ear to his cries for 
reform. Sir George Buchanan contacted his foreign office 
about this same time in May, and said that something had 
to be done to prevent Lenin from inciting anarchy and 
encouraging the troops to leave the front and come home 
to forcefully seize the land if necessary (5:119). 
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Fear of a Bolshevik coup was not the only concern 
of Americans for internal stability in Russia. The Work-
men's and Soldiers' Deputies was thought by many to be 
the greatest threat to the continuance of the Provisional 
Government. Winship wrote on several occasions to Lansing 
expressing his concern about the increasing power and 
influence of the Deputies. The extreme socialists within 
the Deputies now had a larger sounding board than they 
would have had if they had been united with other social-
ists. "Workmen make exorbitant demands," cabled Francis 
to the State Department, expressing his concern about 
the growing strength and independence of the socialist 
Deputies (63:861.00/378). This division of Russian power 
did not go unnoticed by the American public. George 
Kennan wrote several articles in The Outlook describing 
his disturbance over the dangers resulting from lack of 
central control of the Government. He was perturbed at 
the Provisional Government for playing chess with the 
Deputies over social reforms and peace when they should 
have been concentrating on winning the war; then peace 
would follow (28:217-19). 
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The governmental crisis in early May aptly dis-
played the weakness of the Provisional Government. Foreign 
Minister Milyukov sent a declaration of Russian war aims 
to the Allied powers with a note of explanation. The note 
included promises to proceed with the war as originally 
intended, and inaccurately reported that the will to 
fight had grown stronger among the Russian people. Th.is 
infuriated the people; large crowds gathered immediately 
to call for Milyukov's resignation. The Petrograd Soviet 
hastily went into conference with the Cabinet and deter-
mined that a new note would be sent to clarify certain 
phrases in the note. The Soviet then ordered all mili-
tary units to abandon the streets unless otherwise ordered 
by the Soviet Executive Committee (6:143-45). 
The results of the May Crisis were multiple: 
first, the Petrograd Soviet displayed its authority over 
the soldiers by ordering them off the streets; second, 
the Soviet allowed their membership to join the newly 
formed and more socialist Cabinet; and lastly, the May 
Crisis made it clear to the Allies that the Russians were 
dissatisfied with the existing war aims as mentioned in 
the secret treaties. 
To support the statement that the socialist par-
ties were rapidly gaining strength in Russia are the 
results of the Duma elections. Winship sent the results 
to Lansing: bourgeois parties received a total of 167,309 
votes; socialists, 389,941; Bolsheviks, 107,760 (63: 
861.00/439). The socialists had dominant control of the 
Dumas. Izvestiia pointed to the fact that the election 
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was a large socialist victory, but they cautiously said 
that it was also a defeat for extremism on both sides of 
the Workmen's and Soldiers• Deputies platform (4:1299-
1300). This last comment referred to the bourgeois on 
one hand, the Bolsheviks on the other. The decision of 
the voters has to be impressive. Adding all socialist 
votes together, they received 497,702 versus the bour-
geois' 167,309; or in terms of Duma seats, 477 to 171. 
The election resulted in an open expression of choice 
for the socialist program. The bourgeois parties, gene-
rally supported by Francis, were losing ground rapidly 
to the reform-minded socialists. 
There can be no question that the socialists were 
strong in May and June of 1917. Socialists represented 
a large portion of the people and thus it was significant 
when they avoided making any comment regarding the United 
States entrance to the war, Winship explainedo He said 
that the only statements about the war effort were from 
the middle classes, and that even Samuel Gomper•s message 
of congratulations on their new government was received 
without comment (63:861.00/395). The American government 
officials were not attuned to the socialist mindo The 
socialist language, goals, and means of achieving these 
goals were different from those of the Americans. Germany 
posed the only real threat to peace from the American 
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point of view, but the Bolsheviks looked upon all capi-
talist countries as potential threats to peace, including 
England and the United Stateso 
Conditions in the month of June deteriorated some-
what, and resulted in the creation of a new government 
in July. Roland Morris in Sweden described the Russian 
scene as poor and disorganized. He felt the condition 
of the economy and labor was such that Russia was headed 
for serious problems (63:861.00/389). John A. Ray was 
not as blunt in his pessimism as was Morris, but he did 
point out that the people were concerned about the war 
50 
and wanted a peace without annexations, contrary to known 
Allied wisheso According to Ray, the laborers were too 
busy playing politics to do their regular jobs. The people 
were becoming restless because of the war and the crop 
failures, he asserted (63:861.00/436). Winship also 
described conditions in Russia as generally poor. 
Despair and gloom over the Russian scene was not 
the only picture painted for the State Department; Francis 
and Congress helped build confidence in Russia's strength. 
Messages sent to Lansing by Francis were filled with 
optimistic phrases such as "Government gaining confidence 
and courage," or just simply, "conditions are improving11 
(63:861.00/388). Congress managed to contribute to Russia's 
continued good standing with the American public. Meyer 
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London, United States Representative from New York, managed 
a round of applause from fellow House of Representatives 
members when he said, "Russia has brought a stream of new 
life and liberty, not only for the people of Russia, but 
for all mankind" (9:4540). Other speeches of praise fol-
lowed Representative London's, and although not all agreed, 
a number of resolutions were presented describing the con-
fidence that the United States had in the Russian ability 
to pull through this trying time. 
Through the Provisional Government's own reports, 
one could easily see their desperate condition at this 
time. The Minister of Trade and Industry admitted that 
the economic conditions were very bad; he stated that the 
constant struggles of classes within Russia were causing 
turmoil. Labor was demanding higher wages, he said, thus 
endangering the stability of the ruble (4:672-73). Another 
report to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies by the Minister of Food, made it 
clear that the government must cooperate with the Deputies. 
The Minister asked them to help make the population aware 
of the need to sacrifice for the country as a whole (4:636). 
Other reports continued to be filed showing the internal 
conditions as far less than desirable. At this point, it 
seems strange that with so many people describing poor 
conditions in Russia and so few reports in favor of the 
stability of the government, that the State Department, 
for the most part, chose to embrace the latter view. The 
wish to accomplish the revered war aims apparently was 
more important than seeking an understanding of Russia 
in reality. 
The month of June brought out more determined 
cries for a stronger leader in the Provisional Government. 
Prince Lvov proved to be unable to take charge and direct 
the government more authoritatively than the Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies. Winship noted the general lack 
of authority exhibited by the Provisional Government 
(63:861.00/450)0 This obvious lack was even discussed 
by the American news media. The Spectator said the con-
fused times called for a great leader and they mentioned 
Army General Brusilov as a potential leader; a man who 
could carry Russia on to victory over the Germans and 
lead the Russian people to a new world of democracy--
American style (55:631)0 
When the Provisional Government was first estab-
lished in March, it was to be a temporary government, 
holding power only until a Constitutional Assembly could 
be elected and convinced to create a Constitution and a 
truly representative government of the Russian peopleo 
The Provisional Government had intended to hold elections 
September 30, and the Assembly to start on October 13 
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(4:445), but conditions forced another postponement. The 
failure to convene the Constitutional Assembly gave the 
Bolsheviks the badly-needed time--and reason--to over-
throw the Provisional Government in November. 
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CHAPTER III 
SPECIAL MISSIONS TO RUSSIA 
President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing viewed Russia as a struggling democracy, 
and thought that a special mission to Russia would express 
the sincere interest of the United States. The success 
of the actual mission is highly questionable. Secretary 
Lansing was concerned about the increasing socialist pro-
paganda within Russia, and suggested to President Wilson 
that a committee be organized to help combat it. Wilson 
agreed (1:16-17). 
President Wilson then named Elihu Root to head a 
mission to Russia to express the genuine American interest 
in and sympathy with the Russian Revolution, and to coop-
erate with the Russians in conducting the war. Unfortu-
nately, the purpose of the Root Mission was to try to 
keep Russia in the war, not to find out if she wanted to 
continue fighting. There was some question about the 
authority of the Root Mission over committees such as 
the Railroad Commission in Russia, but Lansing informed 
Root that the Missions were separate (22:359). At the 
meeting of the Bourse of Moscow on June 23, 1917, Ambas-
sador Root stated the purpose of the Mission: "We 
intentionally limited the functions of this Mission 
especially to alliance and co-operation in the conduct of 
the war against Germany" (72:763.72/6430~). The Russian 
people did not want to hear this; they were interested in 
land reform and peace. 
The composition of the Root Mission lacked Ameri-
can understanding of the Russian political mood; Wilson's 
choice of Elihu Root to head the Mission was a prime exam-
ple. Root, a conservative Republican, a former Secretary 
of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator from 
New York, never displayed a thorough knowledge of Russia 
or the socialist movement. He was committed to the idea 
of defeating Germany, with or without Russia. Root's 
activities while in Russia and his "no fight, no loan'' 
attitude were unfortunate, for it gave the State Depart-
ment a false image of the Russian capacity and will to 
continue fighting. The Commission needed a liberal leader 
with compassion for a new government and with sympathy 
for the Russian people--Root was no such person. Soon 
after his arrival in Russia, Mr. Root wired to Lansing 
his impression of the Russian people: 
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Please say to the President that we have found one hun-
dred and seventy million people and they need to be 
supplied with kindergarten material; they are sincere, 
kindly, good people but confused and dazed (44:122). 
President Wilson had difficulty finding a man of 
liberal background to head the Russian Mission; one who 
would also be a good representative of Americao Wilson's 
selection of Root was an effort to display bipartisanshipo 
Nevertheless, even a liberal Republican who tried to 
understand the European movement would have been a better 
selection. The neglect to include a Russian expert in 
the Mission compounded Wilson's unsatisfactory selection 
of Root. 
President Wilson selected the other members of 
the Mission from business, finance, military and humani-
tarian organizations. He had difficulty choosing a 
socialist for the Mission, because socialism was not 
a popular American political philosophy. His choice of 
James H. Duncan, Vice-President of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, demonstrated Wilson's misunderstanding of 
the radical Russian socialist mind. American labor was 
a bourgeois philosophy by the radical European socialist 
standards; the American labor movement, according to the 
European socialists, had joined forces with business to 
exploit the world's masses, and Duncan personified this 
idea. Another member of the Commission chosen to please 
the socialists was Charles Eo Russell, one-time socialist 
candidate for President. Russell was an elderly man, and 
was in favor of continuing the war; this kept him from 
acceptance by the Russian socialists. The two military 
members of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and 
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Admiral Glennon, who understandably embraced the idea of 
continuing the war. American business was represented by 
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s. R. Bertron and Cyrus McCormick. John R. Mott, Executive 
Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, was the 
final member of importance; he was to represent the American 
feelings of human kindness and religious thinkingo The Mis-
sion failed to include any important Russian-speaking member, 
only an interpreter. A more compassionate commission of 
people might have been able to determine Russia's weakness 
and declining will to continue fighting. 
Public reaction to the selection of the Root Mission 
members was mostly favorable in the United States. 1b& 
North American Review considered Root a true representative 
of self-government and self-determination. They said his 
Mission was to extend American friendship and lend a helping 
hand in the face of the common enemy (38:829-34). Senator 
Miles Poindexter of Washington declared on the Senate floor 
that the Mission was charged to bring about cooperation and 
coordination of the Allied cause (7:745). The New York 
Times claimed Root to be the best diplomatic brain to com-
bat German diplomacy, and said that his Mission was "one of 
the most difficult diplomatic missions which the United 
States has ever undertaken in foreign lands" (22:354). On 
May 15, the Times stated bluntly that the purpose of the 
Mission was "to save Russia to the Entente cause" (22:354). 
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Mr. Ivan Narvodny, Vice-President of the Russian-American 
Asiatic Corporation, stated that the socialist element in 
Russia would not lead the government because the intellec-
tual middle class would unite with the peasants and establish 
a federal republic (37:1401). By this comment, he approved 
the absence of a radical socialist in the Mission. 
There was some criticism of Root and his Mission 
members, but it was not made public until after the com-
pletion of the Mission. A socialist magazine in New York, 
Call, did criticize Root as being the personage of what 
the Russians had rejected in Tsarism, and wrote that Root 
was an insult to all of Russia's hopes and desires (37:1401); 
this was a minority view, however. On May 20, 1917, the 
Mission left for Vladivostok, Russia, on the Uos.2. Buffalo. 
Once the Mission reached Russia, each member spoke 
to groups related to his special interest. Mr. Root spent 
a great deal of his time talking to government officials 
and government-related agencies. He made a strong plea 
for the Russian Government to continue the war. On June 22, 
1917, Root addressed the Moscow Duma: 
Our faith in your working out a system of free self-
government, adapted to the conditions and the character 
and the genius of the Russian people, is marred by but 
one doubt; and that is the doubt whether you will be 
able to protect the right to develop your own free gov-
ernment against the malign and sinister control of 
German autocracy (72:763.72/6430t,6). 
He also said that the war was a test to see if Russia was 
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willing to fight for her freedom. The speech was met by 
loud applause, which was only natural, coming from the Mos-
cow Duma, an organ established by the Tsar and manned by 
representatives of the middle class. Other speeches made by 
Root carried basically the same message; that Russia could 
not hope to survive without the defeat of German militarism. 
He rarely referred to Russia's bright future without first 
prefacing it with the need to defeat Germany. 
Ambassador Root tried to convince the Russian peo-
ple of their strong basis for democracy, and he expressed 
unlimited confidence in the ability of the Russians to solve 
their own problems in the wake of German aggression. In 
order to solidify United States-Russian friendship, Root 
said the labor movement in the United States had matured to 
the point where labor could look after its own interests and 
simultaneously cooperate with the government (72:763.72/ 
6430t,5). Organization and enthusiasm were needed by the 
Russian workers to make up for the interruption of Allied 
supplies, Root explained (72:763.72/6430t,4)o The differ-
ences between the labor forces of the two countries were 
glaring, and to tell a war-weary people that they must 
depend on enthusiasm in place of supplies to defeat a 
highly mechanized German army bordered on the ludicrous. 
Discipline in the army almost disappeared immedi-
ately following the Revolution. Root observed this and 
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was appalled; but later, July 13, he said that the army was 
under the direction of a great leader, Alexander Kerensky, 
then Minister of War (72:763.72/6430!,9). Root had faith 
that new direction and purpose had been achieved in the 
army; he made several speeches to soldiers encouraging them 
to continue the fight for democracyo There was cause for 
concern, though, in Germany's propaganda barrage against 
the Provisional Governmento Root asked the State Depart-
ment for immediate funds to combat the German propaganda 
offensive (22:365); and the Mission itself put up thirty 
thousand dollars to start the United States propaganda 
machineryo Lansing agreed to the Mission's advancement, 
but not without careful consideration (22:366)0 Thirty 
thousand dollars to start a propaganda campaign for the 
Allies was a "drop in the bucket," however, considering 
what was neededo 
Despite the shaky foundation of the Provisional 
Government and the obvious unrest and discontent of the 
people, Root believed that the Mission had been success-
ful. He wrote to his wife just before their return trip 
that the Mission left the Government and the army much 
stronger than before (22:367). 
General Hugh Scott inspected the Russian army to 
see if they were willing and capable of an offensive 
against the Germans. The report he filed left the final 
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conclusion somewhat up in the air; he went to great length 
describing the low morale in the Russian army, then con-
cluded they could mount a successful offensive. He reported 
the soldiers had gained control of their local units and 
were issuing orders or only obeying those orders with which 
they agreed. Discipline was absent from the army in the 
early months of the revolutiono Scott saw this lack of 
discipline spreading to the general populace. Workers 
refused to obey "unjust" orders from factory bosses and 
production for the war effort was in serious jeopardy 
(72:763072/6430!,1-8). 
By the time the revolution was a few months old, 
reported Scott, the conditions improved in the army as 
well as in society as a whole. He declared that since 
fewer desertions were evident and since many soldiers were 
returning to the front lines, confidence in the Russian 
will to fight was renewed (72:763.72/6430!,10-12). Scott 
felt the reason for this improvement was due to requests 
from the Provisional Government and the Workmen's and 
Soldiers' Deputieso Apparently the fact of a dual govern-
ment in Russia went unnoticed again in the State Departmento 
General Scott included in his report a memorandum 
by a Colonel Mott describing the Russian military officials 
as evasive when asked for statistical information concern-
ing the Russian army's equipment status (72:763072/6430!)0 
Later in his report, General Scott was willing to accept 
the word of the Russians that their army had improved 
enough to be able to implement an offensive (72:763.72/ 
6430!,19-20). Scott did not indicate that he had gone 
to the front lines to investigate this himself o 
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Railroad cars headed the list of military requests 
given to General Scott by Russian officers. The Russian 
military was very emphatic that munitions sent by the 
United States were of little value unless railroad cars 
accompanied the supplies, to ease the overburdened trans-
portation system in Russiao General Michelson told General 
Scott that they were disappointed when the shipment of the 
requested five hundred locomotives and ten thousand freight 
cars would be postponed until December--they had hoped to 
receive them in July. He went on to say that any military 
move would be greatly impaired without improved transpor-
tation (72:763.72/6430t,3-4). The fact remains that every 
Russian military department listed railroad cars at the 
top of their lists of needed supplies, but the Stevens 
Railroad Commission, set up to assist in operating the 
Russian railroad system, did not operate functionally 
until after the Bolshevik takeover in Novembero 
General Scott made it quite clear that it was in 
the best interests of the United States to loan Russia 
the needed money to continue the war. He maintained that 
if present conditions continued to exist, Russia would be 
forced to drop out of the war; this would be disastrous to 
the Allied cause. A loan of a billion dollars in addition 
to the railroad cars requested was Scott's recommendation 
to save Russia from a separate peace with Germany (72: 
763.72/6430!,26-34). 
By General Scott's own admission, he did not spend 
any appreciable time on the front lines or talking to the 
rank and file soldiers; his time was spent with former 
Tsarist officers (72:763.72/6430!,24-25). However biased 
his view of Russia, Scott's attempt to seek a true pic-
ture of revolutionary Russia was consistent with most 
members of the Mission. 
Admiral Glennon reported on the conditions within 
the Russian navy. Like Scott, Glennon reported that the 
men refused to obey officers' orders, and in some instan-
ces killed a number of unpopular officerso Workers and 
soldiers were working together in controlling all deci-
sions, and the Provisional Government complied with their 
demands (72:763072/6430!,1-6). Again it is evident that 
the Russian Government was not monolithic. 
Glennon used the workers in a naval repair station 
as an example of workers• attitudeso Workmen did not put 
forth a maximum effort, but insisted on having more food 
although their wages were already high. He said that none 
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of the workers put in more than four hours of work time 
a day, despite the fact they were at work eight hours 
(72:763.72/6430i,4-6)o Glennon seemed concerned with 
the general lack of discipline; this was only natural 
from a military man. 
There was no financial stability within Russia, 
according to the report filed by s. R. Bertron and Cyrus 
McCormicko They were explicitly candid in their view of 
the near-disastrous financial crisis in Russia. The Pro-
visional Government was losing support from the people 
as paper money continued ·to inflate to the point of worth-
lessness. Gold deposits did not cover the government's 
outstanding debts, and an effort to float a "Liberty 
Loan" was less that successful because only a few people 
participated. Bertron and McCormick were concerned that 
the people had lost confidence in the Provisional Govern-
ment. They said the only true way to rebuild the economy 
was for the public to restore its faith in the government 
(72:763072/6430~,1-4). 
The financial report concluded that the United 
States must look carefully at Russia's needs and assist 
her in the most crucial areas; Russia's continuance in 
the war was dependent on United States' financial aid. 
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It was agreed that the loan would be safe, because Russia's 
assets were more than sufficient to secure repayment after 
the war. In the meantime, Russia needed a loan immedi-
ately, or Germany might step in with a loan offer (72: 
763.72/6430i,5-6). This idea of German monetary support 
of Russian political groups was common among American 
officials; from an Allied point of view, any financial 
aid to Russia from Germany would be disastrous. 
65 
John R. Mott, Executive Secretary of the Young 
Men's Christian Association, talked to a variety of Rus-
sians, but most of his time was ta.ken up by non-socialists; 
this was typical of the entire Root Mission. His activi-
ties included visiting Russian churches, lecturing for the 
need of a Y.MoC.A. in Russia, a speech at the Cossack 
Congress and various contacts with the intelligentsia and 
educated classeso He concluded that there was no opposi-
tion in any walk of Russian life to the creation of a 
Russian Y.M.CoAo; in fact, most Russians advocated it. 
To make this plan become reality, however, the United 
States would have to generously finance it, according to 
Mott (72:763.72/6430!,3). Soldiers in the army had too 
many hours of leisure in which they sat around thinking 
of their plight. A Y.MoCoA. would give these idle men 
an opportunity to become active and improve their morale 
and raise their spirits, Mott assured in his report (72: 
763.72/6430t,2). He lectured on several occasions to 
popularize his belief in the need of a Russian Y.M.C.A. 
By his own admission, Mott spent considerable 
time conferring with church officials. His feeling was 
that if anyone wished to talk to the Russian people, con-
tact must be made through the Orthodox Church, because it 
was the "Heart of Russia" (72:763.72/6430!,1). Evidently 
Mott did not anticipate reaching the radical socialists, 
as they, with good reason, did not support the former 
Tsarist tool, the Orthodox Church. 
Charles E. Russell, one-time socialist candidate 
for President, spoke to the various socialist parties in 
Russia. He claimed to be a fellow socialist, when in 
fact Russian radical socialists looked upon the American 
socialists as members of the bourgeois. In an address to 
a socialist group, Russell tried to convince them that 
their success and future were solely dependent upon the 
survival of democracy (72:763.72/6430!,2). Nothing could 
have been further from the truth as far as the radicals 
were concernedo Russell did not stop there; he continued 
trying to convince the Russian people that it was their 
duty to fight the Germans; only cowards refuse to fight, 
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he argued (72:763.72/6430!,2). Men should not be afraid 
to die for liberty, liberty they all loved so much--he 
spoke as if the Russians had known liberty all their liveso 
Russell tied German victory to Russian defeat; if Germany 
was able to defeat the Allies, then surely Russia could 
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not hope to survive. Russian liberty could not be tolerated 
in a world dominated by militarism (72:763.72/6430i,1). 
Russell made a last appeal to the socialists by 
saying the United States, a peace-loving nation, was dri-
ven to war to save democracy (72:763.72/6430i,4), and 
Russia's new democracy should join with America in the 
march for a democratic victory. Russians should not fear 
death, for a loss of this war would result in another kind 
of defeat--autocratic rule (72:763.72/6430!,1). From 
Russell's own agenda, he failed to talk enough with all 
groups of socialists, nor did he mention ever talking 
with the Bolsheviks. It is difficult to believe that the 
Russians could have accepted Russell's suggestion that 
only cowards refuse to fight or die for a cause, espe-
cially in light of the millions of Russians that had 
already died in defense of their country. 
The last member of the Root Mission to file a 
separate report was James Duncan, Vice-President of the 
American Federation of Labor. He spent the majority of 
his time speaking to workers and their unionso As pre-
viously explained, the Russian workers were making 
excessive demands on the factories and the Provisional 
Government. These workers were not accustomed to demand-
ing benefits without the Tsar to refuse or even punish 
them. James Duncan began telling them to work extra shifts 
without compensation, putting forth additional effort to 
defeat Germany, because the soldiers were already doing 
their extra share (72:763072/6430!,7-9). This was not 
what the Russian workers wanted to hear. 
In his report to Root, James Duncan made it clear 
that he believed the general conditions within Russia 
had greatly improved. He also mentioned that his attempt 
to convince workers to put in extra shifts had brought 
Cossack criticism of the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and 
agreement with his policy (72:763.72/6430!,9,12). Duncan 
represented American unions as cooperative with the United 
States government's war struggle and hoped to convince 
Russian unions to have the same cooperation with their 
government. 
The Root Mission submitted its final report as 
a composite of their activities as individuals of the 
Mission and their collective views of the general situa-
tion in Russia. Conditions were confusing at first with 
near-anarchy, the Mission reported; but later the govern-
ment gained more trust of the people and was better able 
to govern (72:763.72/6430!,2-3). The Mission displayed 
satisfaction in the Russian character to survive this 
most trying test of their drive for freedom. Transpor-
tation was considered the main problem of the Russian 
government in relation to the war burden, reported the 
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Committee, and railroad cars were desperately needed 
(72:763.72/6430!,10-11). 
Root's final report continued by listing their 
objectives: the first two were general platitudes of faith 
in Russian democracy; the third described the essence of 
the Mission: 
To promote a realization of the fact that the effective 
continuance of the war was the only course by which the 
opportunity for Russia to work out the conditions of 
her own freedom could be preserved from destruction by 
German domination (72:763.72/6430!,24). 
Francis held this same belief; in fact the report gave 
credit to Francis for supporting the Mission's activities 
in Russia, and supporting their conclusions (72:763.72/ 
6430!,26). Finally, the Mission summarized that United 
States aid was necessary to keep Russia in the war. 
Their last comment in reference to the suggestion for 
aid was: 
That the benefit of keeping Russia in the war and its 
army in the field will be so enormous that the risk 
involved in rendering the aid required should not be 
seriously considered (72:763.72/6430!,26-27). 
Public reaction to the Root Mission's report was 
understandably enthusiastic. The report described the 
Russians as hard-fighting people longing for peace and 
the same style of democracy America cherishedo Although 
it had a limited circulation, ~Nation did sum up gene-
ral public opinion of Root and his Mission when it wrote 
about Root's opening speech in Petrograd: 
o • • that speech will remain one of the masterly 
documents of the war. It showed perfect understanding 
blended with such sympathy as many more 1tdemocratic11 
personages and organs of public opinion than Mr. Root 
have shown themselves incapable of ••• (47:166-67). 
Unfortunately, Mro Root did have the sympathy for the 
Russian cause, but not the understanding of their peculiar 
situation. 
President Wilson seemed to disregard completely 
any suggestions by the Mission and also neglected to talk 
to Root after his returno The matter of implementing the 
Mission's recommendation was passed on to the Creel Com-
mittee of Public Information. Wilson never talked to 
Root after that to discuss Russian problems or possible 
solutions. It seems strange that during the later Allied 
invasion of Russian Siberia that Root was not consulted 
for his thoughts on the subjecto 
Hindsight offers the view that the Root Mission 
was far from successful. The members of the Mission were 
not logical choices to send to a struggling revolutionary 
country; most of them saw in Russia only what they wanted 
to see, and conditions were either ignored or misreado 
This is easily understood, as few of them bothered to 
associate with the radical socialists; only those people 
and groups that agreed with them were consulted. Root's 
recommendations fell far short of a comprehensive plan to 
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save Russia; films and Y.M.C.Ao games were not going to 
win the desperately needed time for the Russians to col-
lect their thoughts and create a cohesive political 
philosophyo The war was a thorn in her side; it had to 
be removed for her to survive. David Francis summed up 
the sad American misunderstanding in his usual naive and 
candid way when he asserted: "· o • the Commission repre-
sented all the interests in our own country, and had come 
for the purpose of welcoming Russia to the sisterhood of 
republics" (18:128). How unfortunate; the Russians did 
not want to hear loudly sung platitudes of democracy 
from the warring Allies, they wanted to be left to build 
their own dreams. 
Successful prosecution of the war by Russia was 
of paramount interest to the Allies. The lack of equip-
ment and coordination of the transportation system have 
been mentioned in connection with the Root report, and 
as the first few months after the Revolution unfolded, 
it became increasingly evident to the Allies that there 
was need for their assistance in coordinating Russian 
railroads. The United States made inquiries of the Rus-
sian government as to whether such assistance would be 
welcome. What could they say? Even David Francis recog-
nized the true problem when he said the Russian railroad 
personnel were competent, but the lack of government 
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cooperation and equipment reduced their efforts to confu-
sion; he went on to say that the Russians resented outside 
advice (71:861.77/48). Nevertheless, the United States 
organized a Railroad Commission, headed by engineer John 
Stevens, to advise the Russians on railroad organizational 
matters. Due to illness and equipment delays, the Commis-
sion did not begin to operate fully in Russia until the 
Provisional Government had fallen under Bolshevik pressure. 
Not surprisingly, the Railroad Commission had little effect 
on the Provisional Government. The United States would have 
been in a better position by sending the needed railroad 
equipment requested than to send advisors to Russia. Advice 
they had; equipment they lacked. 
President Wilson felt that it was necessary to make 
the thoughts and feelings of the United States known to the 
Russian infant democracy. He assigned George Creel's Com-
mittee on Public Information to this task; in turn, Creel 
selected Edgar Sisson to head the actual delegation to 
Russia. Sisson explained his purpose as helping to imple-
ment the "practicable portion" of the Root report, explain 
the American purpose and struggle in the war and to weaken 
German morale whenever possible (51:3). Sisson1 s group 
sailed October 27 and arrived in Russia November 25--
eighteen days after the demise of the Provisional Govern-
ment. 
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Although the Information Committee arrived after 
the Bolshevik takeover, Sisson still provided another view 
of the problems discussed earlier. His opinion of David 
Francis was mixedo Francis' hatred of the Bolsheviks was 
obvious, according to Sisson (51:29), and his general lack 
of confidence in Francis' ability and objectiveness was 
supported by otherso He suggested that Ambassadors should 
be removed and replaced by better qualified coordinators 
of war-time policy in time of war (51:30). 
Sisson considered the Root report recommendations 
to be vague and somewhat "unpractical." The implementa-
tion of a mass propaganda campaign in Russia could not be 
started immediately, nor could it have guaranteed success. 
The dollar cost of such a program would be high; Sisson 
favored a close watch on money expenditures (51:5). 
Sisson's Committee arrived in Russia too late to be of 
any help, but he does bring to light a few crucial issues 
that concern this paper. 
There was one last Mission to Russia: the Red 
Cross. The Red Cross was controversial not because of 
its intended purpose, but because of the individuals 
involved as the leaders of this supposedly charitable 
organizationo Two men in the Red Cross were noteworthy; 
one for his complete disregard for presidential and poli-
tical channels, and the other for his direct involvement 
in Russian Government activities after the Bolshevik take-
over. William Boyce Thompson, a Chicago millionaire, was 
appointed to lead the Red Cross group in Russia, although 
his qualifications for such a job were questionableo The 
other controversial member was Raymond Robins, a full time 
social reformer who was known to have been in contact with 
74 
Russian revolutionaries prior to his Red Cross appointmento 
The purpose of the Red Cross in Russia was to help 
the people regardless of their political affiliations and 
to impress upon them that the United States wanted to help 
(14:272). By the time Thompson re-interpreted the purpose 
of the Red Cross, it was indistinguishable from the origi-
nal. Thompson admitted he would do all in his power to 
keep the Russian forces intact (19:184), and he put it 
bluntly in memorandum form: 
The problems which it was apparent to me must be 
met in Russia were three in number: 
1. How to assist Russia and keep her actively 
fighting in the Entente Alliance. 
2. Failing in No. 1, how to prevent Russia from 
making a separate peace. 
3. Failing in Nos. 1 and 2, how to prevent Russia 
from being used by Germany against the Allies (19:201). 
These objectives do not sound like objectives of a chari-
table organizationo Thompson worked hard to help the 
Allied cause; he was a frustrated man who used charity 
work to vindicate his long life of merciless money making. 
Even while living in Russia, Thompson surrounded himself 
with luxuries and associated mainly with top government 
officials, something he was accustomed to in the United 
States. 
Raymond Robins was more astute in revolutionary 
ideas and methods than Thompson, and he used his ability 
to push hard the American message to the Russian people. 
He, more than anyone, talked to all sides of the Russian 
society; Robins would exchange ideas with any man, no 
matter how radical. He traveled throughout Russia lec-
turing to soldiers and to anyone who would listen about 
America's purpose in entering the war. Reality finally 
dawned on Robins, as he admitted in late October, "The 
war is dead in the heart of the Russian soldier" (20:46). 
After the Bolshevik counter-revolution in November, to 
the dismay of many Americans, Robins continued on in 
Russia talking frequently with Bolshevik leaders. 
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Education of the Russian mind to combat the German 
propaganda offensive was Thompson's major objective. He 
was excited by Catherine Breshkovsky 1 s committee to inform 
the public of their duties to a people's government. His 
devotion to his new found role was so zealous that he con-
tributed one million dollars of his own money toward the 
propaganda fund in Russiao With this money he started 
newspapers, lectures and various organizations to pass 
the word that the success of the revolution was contingent 
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on Germany's defeato Thompson realized, however, that one 
million dollars was not enough, so he cabled Washington 
explaining his program and requesting one million dollars 
immediately and three million a month thereafter. Three 
weeks elapsed before a weak message arrived from Washington 
saying that the matter was under considerationo The mes-
sage also advised that a member of the Committee on Public 
Information, Edgar Sisson, would soon arrive in Petrograd 
to administer American propaganda (20:38-39). Thompson con-
tinued to press for the urgently needed funds as he wrote 
to Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the American Red Cross, to 
pressure Wilson into some form of action on Washington's 
part until the matter received further study. Davison urged 
Thompson not to commit himself to further involvement with-
out government approval (19:219). Thompson persisted, 
however, but Wilson ably avoided his proddingo 
Sisson's Propaganda Committee left for Russia with 
approximately one-eightieth of Thompson's request and a 
message from Wilson lauding him for good work and hinting 
that he avoid any further involvement (19:231). Wilson's 
neglect of Thompson's ideas seems consistent with his avoid-
ance of most other matters concerning Russian internal 
affairs. Germany's defeat and the enactment of Wilson's 
Fourteen Point program were first priority. 
Henry P. Davison wrote in later years that the Red 
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Cross had done a good job in light of the difficult circum-
stances. He listed the supplies sent to Russia, such as 
ambulances and medical supplies, milk and a limited amount 
of funds for relief work (14:269). Davison was naive in 
his assumption of Red Cross accomplishments; the small 
dent they made in the Russian problem was almost unnoticed 
by the Russians, and, for that matter, not necessarily wel-
comed. Thompson and Robins were busy involving themselves 
in Russian politics and did not perform customary Red Cross 
work. Thompson's concern was with Russian mobilization 
against the advancing Germans in order to save the revo-
lution, not in the commonplace distribution of medical 
supplies. This is not to say they were unsuccessful, but 
they surely did not accomplish for the Red Cross what Mr. 
Davison would have had the public believe. 
American attempts through the various special mis-
sions to influence Russia to resist German aggression were 
doomed to failure. All of these missions had preconceived 
ideas of the Russian situation and how to cope with it; 
none had any understanding of the people's desire for their 
own chance to govern themselves in peace. 
The Red Cross Commission did not perform its inten-
ded duties and the only reason it is mentioned is because 
of its participants, Thompson and Robins. Edgar Sisson's 
Propaganda Committee was doomed to failure from the outset 
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because the Bolsheviks had attained control by the time 
Sisson arrived. The Stevens Railroad Commission suffered 
the same fate: inactivity until the Bolsheviks took over. 
Even though the Mission was set up in time, the first months 
were spent in talking--time the Bolsheviks used for positive 
activity. Lastly, the Root Mission failed because its mem-
bers, for the most part, were not attuned to the needs of 
the peopleo Russell and Duncan were the only members who 
talked with all parties in Russia, and then only on a 
limited scale. The Mission had sailed from Seattle with 
pre-conceived notions as to Russia's problems and their own 
views of remedies for these problems; they returned without 
adequate solutions. One should keep in mind, though, that 
all of these Missions, the men involved and conclusions 
reached, were representative of general American thought. 
Only a small minority of viewers could see the true picture 
of Russia--and they were generally ignored. 
George F. Kennan, writing in Soviet-American Rela-
tions, agreed that the Missions had little "appreciable 
favorable effect on the course of events in Russia." In 
fact, he suggested that some of the Missions were not 
wanted by the Russians, but only tolerated in order to 
receive materials from the United States (29:21). 
CHAPTEH IV 
DIPLOlVIACY: JULY THROUGH OCTOBER 
July to November of 1917 was a time of utter con-
fusion; crisis after crisis arose, yet the Provisional 
Government managed to weather each one, losing some control 
each time. By November the situation was such that the much 
discredited and weakened government could not bear the pres-
sure and had to succumb to the Bolsheviks. Hindsight shows 
an America committed to the war encouraged a weakening 
Provisional Government to go on fighting. Even after the 
fall of the government, the American public failed to 
understand what had happened and why. This chapter will 
deal with the major events of this five month period, with 
special emphasis on the Bolsheviks. 
Alexander Kerensky was without question the most 
important man in the Provisional Government. To discuss 
him and all the controversy involved with him would be 
voluminous, to say the least; however, it is not the intent 
of this paper to present a biographical sketch of Alexander 
Kerensky. 
David Francis had great difficulty establishing an 
attitude toward Kerensky. He wanted a dictatorial leader 
of the government, but also one who could see the problem 
of Russia from Francis' viewpoint. Kerensky was indeed the 
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strongest member of the government, but not nearly strong 
enough to cope with decisions that required firmness or 
farsightedness. Francis put his trust in Kerensky, but was 
critical of his weakness in dealing with the Bolsheviks and 
the General Kornilov Affair, which was an apparent attempt 
to overthrow the Provisional Government. In later years, 
Francis was critical of Kerensky's failure to deal firmly 
with Lenin and Trotsky (18:193-94). 
July was a disruptive month in Russia. The govern-
ment was shaky and eventually fell, only to be replaced by 
another coalition governmento Francis began to report the 
general disruption and unrest of the people on the first 
day of July. He observed that parades were being organized 
with banners flying calling for "Bread, Peace, Freedom," 
well-known Bolshevik demands. The only government support-
ers Francis mentioned were the Cossacks (63:861.00/419). 
The next week the local Dumas held elections with results 
that could have meant a gradual change in the attitude of 
the people toward their own government and the war. Maddin 
Summers, Consul in Moscow, reported that the local election 
witnessed victory for the various socialist parties. He 
was careful to point out that the election showed no direct 
opposition to the war, although more than ten per cent of 
the votes were cast for the Social Maximalists (Bolsheviks). 
The Socialist Revolutionaries won the majority of the votes; 
they were a peasant party with less radical demands than 
some fellow socialist parties (63:861.00/466). North 
Winship reported basically the same results in the Petro-
grad election for Duma representatives. The socialists 
completely dominated the election with the Socialist Revo-
lutionaries gaining the majority of seats, but only by a 
slim margin. The Bolsheviks received 37 seats out of 200 
(the Socialist Revolutionaries received 54), but combined 
with the less radical half of their party, the Social 
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Democrat Mensheviks, they held 77 seats, by far the largest 
voting block (63:861.00/463). If nothing else, the elec-
tions indicated a turn toward the socialist view and closer, 
if only slightly, to the position of questioning the war. 
Francis failed to see this trend. 
On July 17, 1917, demonstrations against the gov-
ernment intensified. Francis reported that a large gathering 
at the Duma called for Kerensky's arrest. Many Ministers 
resigned because of the disturbance, and Prince Lvov, Presi-
dent of the government, drew up plans to implement demands 
of the peasantso It was even suggested that the Workmen and 
Soldiers take command of the government (63:861.00/427). 
Roland Morris cabled Lansing concerning the disruptive con-
ditions in Petrograd, declaring that some soldiers had shot 
their officers and uncontrolled rioting was present (63: 
861.00/422). 
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Francis reported on July 20, 1917, that Prince Lv.ov 
resigned as President of the Russian government, and sug-
gested that Kerensky be his successor because he was the 
only man who could execute the government plans. Lvov was 
very pleased with his governmental term, mainly because it 
had prevented the advance of the Bolsheviks, Lenin had been 
arrested, and the army was taking its orders from the Mini-
stry, which suggested stability (63:861.00/430). Lvov also 
announced, through Francis, that the Bolshevik faction had 
been eliminated--apparently he neglected to look closely at 
the recent Duma electionso 
Kerensky returned from the front as Prince Lvov 
resigned, and immediately offered his resignation, but, as 
Francis concluded, was wisely refused. Francis was con-
cerned that Kerensky's resignation amidst the new active 
militancy of the workers would be fatal to the government's 
survival (63:861.00/424). It is interesting to compare at 
this same time Winship's impressions of Russia's needs with 
this conclusion of ~"rancis'. Winship felt that a new and 
strong coalition government was not enough; there had to 
be a more cohesive attitude among the classes of Russian 
society. He said: 
As long as war lasts this disintegration will continue 
to progress geometrically. But a real burst of genuine 
patriotism, which means unity and co-operation between 
classes, could slow down the process and perhaps keep 
Russia on her feet until the end of the war (63:861.00/ 
478). 
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Winship continued to be critical and somewhat sarcastic of 
the Provisional Government's ability to control the people, 
and asserted that only the Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies 
were able to exercise any degree of authority over the 
troops (63:861.00/450). 
The appointment of a new Ministry by Kerensky was 
a good sign, according to Francis, but he admitted that food 
riots had to be curbed if the Ministry hoped to be effective. 
He went on to explain that criticism of the Workmen and Sol-
diers by competent men indicated "improved public sentiment" 
(63:861.00/461). 
The contrast between Winship's and Francis' analysis 
of the situation was glaring. Winship refused to believe 
that one man could change the complexion of a people's atti-
tude and psychological makeup, whereas Francis wanted to see 
stability in the new government and weakness in the Workmen's 
and Soldiers' Deputies. Winship witnessed the increasing 
power of the Deputies, but Francis only reported the hopeful 
demise of their influence in Russia. Failure to recognize 
changing public sentiment and increasing influence of the 
Deputies continued to be Francis' greatest faulto 
Kerensky's new government was met with mixed emo-
tions by his fellow Russians. The moderate socialists were 
enthusiastic about his chances for successful use of the 
country's resources; the claim that the government was 
non-partisan was not uncommon. The Rabochaia Gazeta wrote 
that the government would "save the country .from military 
devastation" (4:1432). 12.tlQ. Naroda claimed Kerensky was 
just the political genius needed to stabilize the govern-
ment (4:1434). Support o.f the government was guaranteed 
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by Izvestiia; it .felt the government represented the essen-
tial parts o.f Russian politics (4:1435). 
Opposition to Kerensky's government was not absent. 
The conservative parties were opposed to the predominately 
socialist government. Novoe Vremia criticized the inclusion 
o.f radical socialists in the Ministry; those whose loyalty 
was questionable (4:1430). The more radical socialists 
opposed the government because it .failed to disassociate 
.from inadequate programs and did not pass social legisla-
tion rapidlyo Novaia Zhizn supported this view (4:1436). 
A few papers took a more cautious "wait and see" attitude 
toward the new Ministryo It is apparent that Kerensky did 
not have unquestioned support from the inception o.f his 
government. He did have the backing o.f the major parties 
currently in public favor; he eventually lost this support. 
American diplomats disagreed on the meaning of 
Russian internal conditions in July. The biggest news of 
the month was the unsuccessful uprising of the Bolshevikso 
As far as the general conditions go, most American observers 
were concerned about Russia's stability and desire to 
continue the war. Railroad conditions were reported by 
D. Bo Maggowan, Vice Consul at Moscow, to be very bad. 
Relations between railroad workers and management had 
deteriorated to a point where the workers refused to 
obey management orders and demanded control for them-
selves (71:861.77/145)0 
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Messages arrived at the State Department describing 
apathy in the people and a lack of enthusiasm for continu-
ance of the war. This feeling of apathy was coupled with 
a growing push by some socialists for a separate peace with 
Germany. Winship reported on several occasions that the 
socialists viewed the war and victory differently from the 
Allies or the Russian Government. "Peace without annexa-
tions" was the socialist demand; they believed the improved 
Russian army now could command consideration for acceptance 
of this proposal (63:861.00/455). 
As before, David Francis refused to state that con-
ditions were taking a turn for the worseo On those few 
occasions that Mr. Francis did relay declining conditions, 
he generally concluded his message with words of encourage-
ment about the newest improved conditionso In July, as in 
past months, he supported the Russian government's stand. 
Conditions were improving, he said on July 23; workers fully 
recognized the government and a stricter discipline had been 
restored in the army (63:861.00/432). 
Again the pattern was the same: Francis conveying 
hope, promise and false conditions, and other observers 
seeing doubt and reason to believe in eventual Russian 
defeat unless something was done to change the situation. 
Francis' version of the story was accepted by the Wilson 
Administration because it encouraged Wilson in his hope 
for an Allied peace. 
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Bolshevik activity was the main topic of discussion 
in dispatches to Washington during the month of July. The 
Bolsheviks attempted a coup on July 16, 17 and 18, when 
their activity was forced by the restless workers and sol-
diers. This aggressive unrest was evident in factory 
demands and soldier unwillingness to fight. The socialists 
were becoming more influential, but even the Bolsheviks were 
finding it difficult to restrain the over-zealous people. 
Alexander Kerensky was aware of this unrest among 
the people and as Minister of War he decided a major offen-
sive on the Russian-German front would divert the attention 
of the people and give Russia the international prestige 
needed to continue the war (6:164-65)0 The offensive started 
well because the Russians faced only the weak Austrian sol-
diers, but when German re-enforcement arrived, the Russians 
panicked; soldiers threw down their rifles and fled. 
The offensive was a failure from the military view, 
and it compounded unrest among the masses. Discontent with 
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the revolution grew to a point of becoming uncontrollable 
in the citieso The Bolsheviks did not want to attempt a 
coup in July; they were forced into it from fear that the 
Bolsheviks would lose control of the radical element (6:166). 
The July Crisis was poorly organized and eventually 
failed, but not without causing the exposure of the weak-
ness of the Provisional Government. Publications of German 
documents by Gregory Alexinsky and Vasily Pankrativ, men 
of questionable character and intent, helped control the 
crisis. They alleged that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were 
German agents. William Chamberlin suggested in The Russian 
Revolution 1917-21, that Kerensky encouraged the publication 
of the documents in order to destroy Bolshevik power (6:181). 
The allegations in the documents were damaging to the Bol-
sheviks; many were forced into hiding while others were 
being arrested. 
The results of the Kerensky offensive and the July 
Crisis were of a conservative nature. Top Bolshevik leaders 
were in jail or in hiding; unruly army regiments were broken 
up; some arms searches were conducted; the death penalty was 
restored on July 25; additional restrictions were imposed on 
the press; and a new Cabinet was formed on August 6, made up 
of right-wing socialists and non-socialists, with Alexander 
Kerensky named Prime Minister on July 21 (6:184-89). 
Francis reported that the Bolshevik uprising caught 
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the government by surprise. Hundreds were reportedly killed 
as the Cossacks resisted the Bolsheviks (63:861.00/428). 
A strong government would have been prepared to stop such 
a limited attempt at a coup, but Kerensky assured Francis 
that many Bolsheviks had been captured and would be severely 
punished. Francis observed that some people hoped Kerensky 
would assume dictatorial powers, but Francis doubted this 
would happen (63:861.00/440). 
Defeat of the Bolsheviks was not just a fancy of 
Mr. Francis; others, including Russian government offi-
cials, hoped for the same thing. Bolshevism was at an end, 
according to a government official, echoed Roland Morris 
from Sweden; the government had failed to capture Lenin, 
but they did believe they had put a stop to the Bolshevik 
movement (63:861.00/431). 
A detailed explanation of the July Bolshevik riots 
was sent to Lansing from Winship in Petrogrado He did not 
give glowing platitudes about government stability and 
strength in the face of an internal enemy, instead he 
described a weakened government feebly resisting a threat 
to its very existence. The riots not only caused death, 
they also caused havoc in the army and with the economyo 
Confidence in the government's strength was challenged 
and slackened to a point where the Liberty Loan was in 
jeopardyo Government support from the troops and police 
was questionable during the disorders and would continue 
to be. It is interesting to note, as Winship indicated, 
that even though many moderate socialists refused to sup-
port and even opposed the Bolshevik riots, they defended 
them against accusations of being pro-German. Winship 
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also concluded that each attempt at Bolshevik pressure on 
the government had grown more intense and the Bolsheviks 
were far from dead after this last setback (63:861.00/477). 
A less objective, though more positive stand on 
the July disorder was put forth by Sir George Buchanan. 
He was aware, and stated frequently, that the Provisional 
Government was too weak and indecisive when trying to stop 
radical groups from disrupting government activities. On 
July 23, Buchanan wired the British Foreign Office that the 
Russians had missed an unparalleled opportunity to stop the 
Bolsheviks permanently. He said the occupation of the 
Pravda offices and imprisonment of key Bolshevik personnel 
was good, but then they returned the captured Pravda docu-
ments and released the prisoners. "The Prime Minister was 
not strong enough to take advantage of this unique oppor-
tunity of suppressing anarchy once and for all" (5:165). 
Official Russian government reaction to the Bol-
shevik uprising was to stop the publication of Pravda and 
any other publication that advocated disobedience in the 
military (4:979). Any type of censorship is dangerous and 
censorship of government opposition is especially haz-
ardouso When people are refused legal public means by 
which to express their views, then illegal and usually 
more radical methods are used to inflame the public mind 
toward a particular cause. Government restoration of 
the death penalty for desertion from the army testified 
to the infiltration of the Bolshevik propaganda calling 
for soldiers to refuse to fight. 
Socialist parties expressed concern that the Bol-
sheviks had weakened the government's ability to maintain 
relative calm. Rabochaia Gazeta expressed this view by 
observing that the July riots opened up the opportunity 
for counterrevolutions. Once the Bolsheviks gained power, 
then near anarchy would reign because no one would be 
able to stop further revolutions (4:1362-63)0 
Aid from the United States to the Provisional Gov-
ernment was extremely important in the relations between 
the two governments, because it displayed the American 
attitude toward the entire Russian situation. In the 
early part of July, when Russia requested an additional 
loan from the United States, Secretary of the Treasury 
William McAdoo was hesitant to approve such a loan with-
out knowledge of the internal conditions of Russia. He 
asked Lansing to have Mr. Root or Ambassador Francis 
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inform him of the conditions (69:861.51/159). The situation 
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was such that a loan was urgently needed to secure Russia's 
continuance in the war, cabled Root. It was recommended 
that a loan of seventy-five million dollars be made avail-
able to the Russian government with no restriction as to 
how or where the money was to be spent (69:861.51/154). 
McAdoo responded immediately with an additional seventy-
five million dollar credit loan to Russia (69:861.51/156). 
A much tougher stand was taken by Ambassador 
Francis, as he was opposed to loans to a weak Russian Gov-
ernment unwilling or unable to continue prosecution of the 
waro Francis was of the opinion that American loans should 
be used to push for a stronger Provisional Government and 
force an increased war effort. On July 18, Francis bluntly 
stated that no loans should be extended unless the present 
Russian government, or a stronger replacement, could main-
tain order and prosecute the war (69:861.51/167). 
This hesitation to assist the Russian government by 
the Treasury Department and the suggested conditional sup-
port from Ambassador Francis depicts official American 
attitude toward Russia. If Russia could have maintained 
order and exercised a more vigorous war effort, then the 
United States would have extended all necessary money and 
materials. There appeared to be no real desire to help the 
Russian people themselves. Even Francis' request for propa-
ganda films to instruct the newly created yet ignorant 
Russian voter how to vote intelligently (meaning against 
the socialist parties) is evidence of American feelings 
toward their "fellow democracy" (67:861.4061/12a). 
Doubt about Russia's stability continued to be 
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the major question when dealing with loanso Francis went 
on questioning the Russian government's ability to continue 
the war before approving loans to them. Finally, on August 
28, Francis told Lansing that the physical wealth of Russia 
was enough to secure any loan the United States might make 
available (70:861051/199). By the time a loan of any sig-
nificant size could be approved and implemented, however, 
the arrival of any purchased materials would be November at 
the earliest. This would be too late. 
During this exchange of notes between various Ameri-
can officials concerning a loan to Russia, a question about 
the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Boris Bakhmeteff, 
arose. The Treasury Department was worried that he might 
not have full authority to negotiate for the loan. The 
State Department requested that Francis clear up this mat-
ter. Francis complied in the affirmative, because by now 
he was convinced that any loan to Russia was worth the risk, 
as the loss of Russia would be too costly to the Allies 
(66:861.24/16). 
Ironically, Francis was now in favor of loans to 
Russia, but the Treasury Department became increasingly 
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more suspicious of Russia's ability to wage waro Acting 
Secretary of the Treasury Oscar To Crosby insisted that no 
further credits from the original seventy-five million dol-
lar loan would be allowed unless Francis could convincingly 
show that the money would not be lost (70:861.51/223). 
Francis continued to press for the loans. 
Securing the loan was difficult enough, but 
receiving the supplies ordered was even harder. Russia 
had ordered a large number of rifles and ammunition from 
the United States to be manufactured primarily by the Colt 
Company. The shipment of these supplies was delayed because 
of the poor transportation in Russia, and doubt as to their 
arrival was expressed by Lansing (66:861.24/15). The final 
blow came when Secretary of War Newton D. Baker told Boris 
Bakhmeteff, Russia's Ambassador, that their order of Vickers 
guns had been cancelled and this word had been passed on to 
the Colt Company. Baker explained that the Vickers gun was 
badly needed on the Western front by the French army, and 
in addition was needed by the United States aircraft because 
it was the only gun that was synchronized with the aircraft 
propellers (66:861024/16). Despite the disappointment Bakh-
meteff must have felt upon hearing this news, the lateness 
of the hour, October 29, 1917, meant time was running short, 
anyway, for this chapter of Russian democracy. 
Russian reaction to the economic scene was, for the 
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most part, restricted to the issuance of the Liberty Loan 
within Russia. A very emphatic call for purchase of the 
loans was made by Izvestiia. It claimed the Soviet of 
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies called on the people to 
buy Liberty Loans (4:490)0 The people did not react well 
to the plea for participation in the program. Den was con-
cerned, saying that neither the peasants nor the workers 
were buying loans. They called for a propaganda program 
to stir up support for the loans (4:491). 
The United States extended a total of 375 million 
dollars in credits to the Russian Provisional Government. 
Due to the internal conditions, this amount of money was 
not adequate to meet Russian needs, but from the Treasury's 
point of view, it was probably too much. 
United States confidence in the Provisional Govern-
ment varied with each interest group. The Missions each 
expressed hope and confidence in the Russians, Francis 
wavered on his support depending on the crisis, and the 
State Department seemed to.have less trust in the Russians 
as the months passed. The United States was willing to 
express reassurance in the Russian government, but less 
and less material support accompanied this feeling about 
their ability to surviveo 
This apparent lack of American belief in the real 
ability of Russia to continue the war in the remaining few 
95 
months was not one-sided. The Petrograd press printed 
several articles criticizing the war and blaming it on all 
capitalists, not just Germany (63:861000/510)0 More to the 
point was the accusation by the Russian press that the 
United States had aided her Western Allies more than Russia 
(63:861.00/476). This added to the already existing agi-
tation in Russia. 
By August, rumblings of real unrest were heard. The 
war was not going well and the people were tired; tired of 
war, tired of government promises for land reforms and tired 
of their new responsibilities. Interest of the general pub-
lic in the politics of their government was declining and 
interest in strictly the economics of life was rapidly 
increasing, according to John Ray, Consul at Odessa (63: 
861.00/539). Maddin Summers reported that the Transporta-
tion Minister predicted terrible things for Russia unless 
she quickly improved internal conditions (71:861077/196). 
President Wilson was also concerned about the mental 
state of the Russian Ministry and masseso He conveyed once 
again a message to the Russians reiterating Allied war aims 
(10:5722-23). Wilson did not take into account that the 
Bolsheviks did not differentiate between the Allies and the 
Germans; the war was one between capitalists. The fight 
must be for liberty and dignity of freedom, Wilson expounded, 
without imposing indemnities, and ultimately form a common 
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bond to guarantee peace in the future. He continued: 
For these are the things we have always professed to 
desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now 
and succeed we may never be able to unite or show con-
~uering force again in the great cause of human liberty 
l10:5722-23). 
The Bolsheviks did not agree with this view--the war was 
only for gain of one side over the othero 
Reports continued to describe the internal condi-
tions of Russia as crumbling. In the month of September, 
Roland Morris was especially active in painting a gloomy 
picture of Russia. Conditions were bad; food was scarce, 
radical propaganda was more intense and the army had more 
rumblings of disloyalty. Army personnel were becoming more 
political, Morris commented, as they refused to obey any 
order unless it was first approved by the Executive Commit-
tee of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council (63:861.00/502). 
A good indication of the erosion of confidence in Russian 
stability was when both Britain and Japan recalled most of 
their citizens from Petrograd. The British wanted all 
women and children to evacuate Petrograd (63:861.00/528). 
As September came to a close, Morris' dispatches grew less 
promising. He continued to write of disrespect in the army 
and that a form of anarchy hung over Russia because no cen-
tral authority currently existed that could command enough 
respect to gain obedience. 
Rumors continued to circulate that the Allies were 
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withdrawing from Petrograd, abandoning the Russians to their 
own chaotic conditions. The Germans and anti-Allied social-
ists in Russia were more than willing to spread such rumors 
in their travels. At this same time in September there was 
a change in the State Department's attitude toward Russia. 
Less confidence was felt in the Russian capability to con-
duct the war to an end, and even less faith remained in 
Kerensky as a leader. Unfortunately, this changing attitude 
did not result in an increased desire to help Russia, only 
in a feeling that Russia would not remain in the war; there-
fore, the attitude developed--"why bet on a losing team?" 
Francis alone continued to search for order among the chaos 
despite his occasional criticism of the Russianso 
In September, despite Francis' doubts about govern-
ment stability, he.mingled his reports of despair with ones 
of faith in Kerensky and the government. Confusion was the 
rule in Russia during this time, and David Francis adapted 
quite well to this state of affairs. His main concern the 
entire time was with Russia's weakness, and the knowledge 
that her loss to the Allied side would cost the United States 
millions of dollars and lives because of an intensified war 
on the Western front. In light of this view, one could 
understand why Francis was interested in Russian government 
stabilityo The lack of food grew more critical, reported 
Francis, and the greatest menace to Russia was the Bolshevik 
party (18:164-65). He was in doubt about who the army 
would follow in time of crisis; with army loyalty split 
between the government, the Deputies, Conservatives and 
Bolsheviks, some officials felt civil war was possible 
(63:861000/523). 
One September communique from Francis stated that 
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he had talked separately to the Japanese Ambassador to 
Russia and various government officials about a contest 
between the government and the Soviet. Each one believed 
the Soviet would be victorious, although Francis felt the 
government would command the loyalty of the army. His 
confidence was rewarded by agreement from the Russian For-
eign Minister (63:861000/527). Another Ministry was formed 
in September by Kerensky, reported Francis, and it was grow-
ing stronger because it did not include any Soviets (63: 
861.00/519)0 Here again is evidence that Francis was not 
cognizant of the reality of Russian politics. Socialists 
were increasingly present in the Ministry after July, even 
though they were not the most liberal socialists. The 
Soviets were the most powerful organization in Russia and 
hoping to exclude them from the Ministry and then claim to 
have a stronger government displayed Francis' complete lack 
of comprehension of politics in general, and especially 
Russian politics. 
The United States never ceased to try to persuade 
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Russia to continue to fight. Messages were sent to poli-
tical and social organizations; Samuel Gompers, for example, 
continued to write to the Russians calling for the workers 
to limit their demands in favor of a united war effort. 
Colonel House emphasized that money must be spent on some 
form of educational propaganda to combat the German propa-
ganda; he drew his conclusion from listening to eyewitnesses 
from Russia (50:140). House expressed a real understanding 
of the events when he concluded that Russia was about to go 
under and wrote, "It is more important, I think, that Russia 
should weld herself into a virile republic than it is that 
Germany should be beaten to her knees (50:153). Few others 
felt the same as Colonel House did in 1917. 
One additional problem had to do with propaganda 
and presenting a good American image: United States treat-
ment of socialists within their own country. There were a 
few trials in which socialists were involved and they drew 
much attention in Russia. Francis attended one gathering 
in September to hear protests against the United States. 
About eight thousand were at the meeting, and were to hear, 
according to a handbill, "how this (free) country deals 
with its revolutionists" (18:165-66). Radical socialists 
continued to question America's support of the Russian 
people versus the American desire to keep Russia in the 
war. 
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During August the Provisional Government called the 
various parties to meet in Moscow to confer on a number of 
problems and discuss the proposed Constitutional Assemblyo 
Opinion varied as to the success of the Moscow Conferenceo 
One group expressed the belief that the government had 
emerged from the Conference with more strength and solid 
support than ever before. Izvestiia agreed that the Con-
ference served the government's interests; in their view 
it had to, because Russia could be saved only if all the 
parties consolidated their goals and worked together for 
survival of the revolution (4:1520). Contrary to this 
view was the theory that the Conference caused Russia to 
split into two political groups. No one emerged a victor, 
everyone suffered a small defeat, wrote Den (4:1518). 
Again, the newspapers split their opinions along political 
lines; the radicals on either end could see no favorable 
outcome in Moscow, whereas moderate socialists wanted to 
see hope, and they did. 
Elections to the Constituent Assembly, already post-
poned from its original dates, was set for November 12, and 
the Assembly itself would convene on November 28, 1917. 
The failure to hold the Assembly earlier, as originally 
planned, probably sent the Provisional Government to an 
earlier death than would otherwise have been the case. 
Land reform was needed before the Tsar fell, and.postponing 
it for a long time after his downfall was more than most 
ignorant peasants could understando The Assembly was to 
alleviate the inequities and distribute the land among 
the peasants; delaying land reform was a major error of 
the Provisional Government. 
The last major crisis Kerensky faced before the 
Bolsheviks took over was the Kornilov Affair. Named for 
General Kornilov, it was particularly important because 
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it not only displayed Kerensky's weakness and the weakness 
of the government, but it also allowed the Bolsheviks to 
gain their final foothold before stepping into power. 
General Kornilov was named Commander-in-Chief of 
all the Russian forces. Francis described him as a man 
of small stature, but an iron constitution coupled with 
a will of steel. He could speak seventeen languages, 
which made him popular among the multitudinous nation-
alities in the Russian army. Strict adherence to mili-
tary rules was enforced by Kornilov. Francis used the 
example of one hundred deserters that had been shot and 
placed on the roadway with placards reading, "I was shot 
because I ran away from the enemy and was a traitor to 
Russia" (18:145). If Francis had the power, he could 
not have molded a man more suited to his ideal. 
Morale improved and discipline was restored to 
the army with the appointment of Kornilov as Commander 
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of the Army. Kornilov believed in a strong government as 
well as a disciplined army. Kerensky's vacillating actions 
concerning the radical socialists, his failure to restore 
order in the army and with the Workmen's and Soldiers' 
Deputies all were an anathema to Kornilov. Rumors that 
forces were at work in Russia to restore the monarchy added 
tension to the differences between the two men. A major 
German victory at the front generated Bolshevik activity 
in Petrograd, and caused Kornilov to move his forces to 
the outskirts of the city. Much confusion followed. 
Kornilov sent Vladimir Lvov to Kerensky to demand 
the latter's resignation and place himself as a temporary 
military dictator. Of course, Kerensky refused and tried 
to find a replacement for Kornilov as Commander of the 
Army. Kerensky could find no one willing to take command 
immediately, and meantime the threat of Kornilov and his 
forces marching on the city was greatly increasede At 
this point, Kerensky made his fatal error; he armed the 
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, including the Bolshe-
viks, to resist Kornilov, which they did successfully 
(63:861.00/501)e Kerensky was caught in the middle of 
two forces with opposing political views, and he will-
ingly armed one to defeat the other. 
Following Kornilov's defeat on September 12, 
Francis cabled Lansing that the government was stronger 
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as a result, but if discipline in the army was not restored 
immediately, Russia would be out of the war (63:861.00/515). 
Kerensky formed a new Ministry and invited the Cadets to 
join; however, the Soviets refused to allow their members 
to join if the Cadets did (63:861000/516). 
Reports came into the State Department that the 
Kornilov Affair had badly shaken the government. The radi-
cals on both ends had gained a larger voice because the 
moderates were busy destroying themselves. Maddin Summers 
claimed that Kerensky was having difficulty forming a new 
cabinet, and criticism was increasing because many people 
thought that Kornilov had been tricked by Kerensky (64: 
861000/600). Odessa was the scene of a shift in power, 
reported John Ray; the workers and soldiers had taken 
command of their local government and declared their 
stand in favor of peace and no confidence in the Provi-
sional Government (63:861.00/525). 
Disappointment has to be an understatement in 
describing Francis' feeling about the Kornilov Affair. 
Kornilov was a man "whose mistake was making demands 
before public sentiment was sufficiently strong in their 
favor to face their acceptance," Francis wrote to Judge 
Henry B. Priest of Sto Louis (18:160-61). Francis was 
bitter as he wrote in later years: 
Had Lvov been a wise and strong man instead of the 
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meddlesome rattle-brain that he was, and had Kerensky 
been big enough to place his country's welfare above 
his own pride and seek some middle ground upon which 
he and Kornilov might have worked against the Bolshe-
viks--their common enemy--they might between them have 
rescued Russia and the world from the curse of Bol-
shevism ••• (18:156-57)0 
Kerensky was viewed as a vacillating idealist by 
Sir George Buchanan. He told the British Foreign Office 
that Kerensky feared a strong Russian army because it might 
someday be used against the revolution (5:186). The weak-
ness of the Kerensky government was now apparent to all. 
Buchanan was no exception; in fact, he had seen a general 
weakness in the Provisional Government long before others 
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Again political beliefs split Russian attitude 
toward the Kornilov Affair. The radicals on the left wing 
were opposed to Kornilov and the radicals on the right wing 
were opposed to the government; the moderates favored the 
government. Support of the government was Izvestiia's 
stand, because it controlled many of the governmental 
operations through the Soviets (4:1597). Those who were 
in sympathy with Kornilov longed for a stronger government 
and strict discipline in the army. Kornilov offered this. 
Former supporters of the Tsar, such as the Church, wanted 
a stronger government (4:824). 
Condemnation of Kornilov came from the Bolshevik 
opposition. They were upset because Kornilov had exposed 
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the already weak Provisional Government to one more trau-
ma tic test which surely weakened it further. Russkiia 
Vedomoski opposed Kornilov's attempted coup on the grounds 
that force was not the way to change the government (4:1592). 
The Kornilov Affair did not expose tacit weakness 
in the Provisional Government, but showed its complete 
impotence. Kornilov's efforts to save Russia from the 
grip of the Bolsheviks sped up the Bolshevik takeover by 
seriously weakening the government and causing Kerensky 
to arm the Bolsheviks. It took a little more than a 
month from Kornilov's defeat to the time of the Bolshevik 
victory. 
In October, Francis, torn between his hope of 
Russian continuance in the war and his view of the rapid 
deterioration of government support, persisted in sending 
confusing cables to Washington. He would describe insol-
uble conditions, then conclude by saying he had faith in 
Russia's ability to emerge from the chaos in good order. 
Moderate socialists had lost their grip on the 
people, claimed Roland Morris, and this left an open ave-
nue for the Bolsheviks and other radicals (64:861.00/581). 
Maddin Summers extended the bad news by reporting the 
economic situation was steadily growing worse; food dis-
tribution was as bad as distribution under the Tsarist 
system (64:861.00/594). 
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An ironic note came at this inopportune time from 
Lansing to Francis. It was a message from the United States 
Chamber of Commerce telling the Russian people that they 
supported the Russian fight against Germany. The message 
continued by pointing out the Chamber's honesty in not 
taking advantage of war time to make excessive profits. 
The Russian Revolution was for democracy and they wanted 
the Russians to know that the democratic Chamber was behind 
them (64:861o00/574a). Here was a message from capitalism's 
own organization telling a country that would become commu-
nist in one month that they should continue to fight for 
democracy. 
Even though Lansing's position toward Russia seemed 
to harden somewhat, he still stated a need to aid Russia as 
late as October 23. In a memorandum he expressed the view 
that a fighting Russia meant the saving of at least one 
million American lives and any aid was worth at least that 
much. Too much caution, such as ~"'rancis used, was not 
correct, Lansing said, but consideration for loans should be 
made on the basis of economy and efficiency, not on Russia's 
stability (70:861.51/241). 
The United States did not give up on Russia. Lan-
sing's attitude was an example of America's steadfast faith 
in the young republic. Even after the Bolshevik takeover, 
the United States refused to abandon all hope of Russia 
remaining with the Allies. 
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One topic remains for discussion in this chapter, 
that of the increase in Bolshevik strength just prior to 
the second revolution in Novembero Following their attempt 
at control in early July, the Bolsheviks remained semi-
dormant until the Kornilov Affair equipped them with arms 
and public reaction against the right wing of Russian poli-
tics. The Bolsheviks won a major victory on September 22 
when they gained a majority of votes in the Petrograd and 
Moscow Soviets, reported Izvestiia. The reason for the 
victory was the split among the Social Revolutionaries 
following the Kornilov Affair. Leon Trotsky, a Bolshevik, 
was named President of the Petrograd Soviet (4:1704); this 
gave the Bolsheviks more prestige than power, but that was 
what counted among an ignorant populace. 
Bolshevik strength continued to increase, according 
to reports by Ambassador Francis. His messages contained 
accounts of unrest and government weakness in the face of 
frequent and oft-threatened demonstrations by the Bolshe-
viks o In the concluding days of September, Francis reported 
agitation by the Bolsheviks to the point where the govern-
ment decided to issue a warrant for Lenin's arrest. Francis 
feared Lenin's arrest might spark an armed clash, but the 
arrest never materialized (63:861.00/558). The selection of 
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the frequently changed Ministry was cause for further con-
flict. Kerensky chose a number of Cadets to fill Cabinet 
posts, much to the consternation of the Bolsheviks. Francis 
speculated that Kerensky had confidence that he could handle 
the threat of the Bolsheviks (64:861.00/579), but Francis 
was well aware of the dangerous atmosphere existing in 
Petrogrado He wrote to his son telling him the British 
Ambassador headed a list of persons the Bolsheviks planned 
to kill, and he, Francis, was not far down the list of 
names; however, he did not seem to be afraid (18:169-70). 
In the few remaining days of October, the Bolshevik 
pressure mountedo There were many threats of demonstrations 
against the government, but nothing developed on a mass 
scale. Francis did say that there was a large demonstra-
tion planned for November 2 and the Bolsheviks were to 
arrest the members of the Provisional Government. The 
government said they would resist any Bolshevik attempt, 
peaceful or otherwise (64:861.00/615). October dispatches 
from Petrograd ended with an altogether typical view from 
Francis when he cabled Lansing: 
Beginning to think Bolsheviks will make no demonstra-
tion; if so shall regret as believe sentiment turning 
against them and time opportune moment for giving them 
wholesome lesson (64:861.00/619)0 
Sir George Buchanan was emphatic in his dislike of 
the Bolsheviks and frequently stated so. He was worried 
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that the socialists would refuse to stop the Bolsheviks 
because of their vague socialist brotherhood, and said that 
if the government could not muster the strength to stop the 
Bolsheviks soon, the only alternative would be an eventual 
Bolshevik government (5:188-89). 
Russian newspapers were bulging with articles 
describing the obvious weakness of the Provisional Govern-
ment. The use of the word "anarchy" was frequent in these 
articles when discussing the general political atmosphere. 
Even the government wrote of the uncontrollable waves of 
anarchy rising across the country bent on destroying Russian 
society; they said this unruliness was fed by foreigners 
hoping to take advantage of a weakened foe (4:1714). There 
was no uniform solution to this disorder, although most 
papers agreed that the government must take a firmer stand 
in controlling it. Izvestiia reported that Kerensky was 
receiving letters from all over Russia requesting govern-
ment action to stop the destruction (4:1644). 
As if general chaos was not enough, reports began 
circulating that the Bolsheviks were agitating for Jewish 
pogroms. Headlines told of the increasing Bolshevik acti-
vity; a new mood existed among the people with the Bolsheviks 
ready to harvest the benefits, claimed~ Naroda (4:1764). 
The Russians could see and sense the coming attempt at domi-
nance by the Bolsheviks. Lenin gave a hint of the Bolshevik 
opportunity to gain public confidence when he severely 
criticized the Socialist Revolutionary Party for betray-
ing the peasants on the issue of land reform (4:581). 
This criticism of the peasants' most influential party 
revealed a degree of Bolshevik assurance that Russian 
society was disrupted enough to let them take control. 
Bolshevism was able to gain control of the Gov-
ernment a few short days into Novembero The results of 
Russian activity from March to November, 1917, have been 
extremely controversial. The immediate public reaction 
was not disbelief at the Provisional Government's death, 
but intense hatred of the Bolsheviks and hope that the 
Provisional Government would return to power. 
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CHAPTER V 
UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION 
The November Bolshevik Revolution was not antici-
pated by the American public, but the public reaction was 
not one of bewilderment and shock; rather, of intense dis-
like of the Bolsheviks. Little time and space was devoted 
to analyzing what went wrong in Russia; most was spent 
criticizing Bolshevism and hoping for a return to power of 
the Provisional Government, or its equivalent. 
As late as November 2, Francis did not appear to 
be worried about the government's stability. He did men-
tion that most of the soldiers had pledged to follow the 
Soviet, controlled by the Bolsheviks. Guards were posted 
outside the various diplomatic embassies for protection; 
Francis did not think the action was significant, "merely 
precaution" (64:861.00/620). On the same day, Lansing 
cabled Francis that the Washington Post had announced that 
Russia was ready to quit the war. He was very concerned 
about this misleading article and feared unpleasant reac-
tion in Russia, so he gave Francis a statement that claimed 
the State Department had received no information from its 
embassies or other sources that indicated Russia's intention 
of quitting the war (64:861.00/621a). Certainly Lansing 
was worried that the Russian government would believe that 
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Francis and other diplomats had given the State Department 
this news; this would be most damaging to the Provisional 
Government's relationship with Francis. 
Internal conditions in Russia grew more confused 
during the first week of November; the Bolsheviks, after 
gaining control of the Petrograd Soviet, were increasing 
their stranglehold on Petrograd itself. Francis was aware 
of this expansion of Bolshevik influence. On November 7 he 
revealed that the Bolsheviks had control of everything; the 
Ministry had disappeared and the soldiers were sympathizing 
with the Bolsheviks. Even the majority of newspapers had 
been suppressed (64:861.00/634)0 The end of the Provisional 
Government had finally arrived; Francis did not mourn like 
a godfather; instead he stood his ground and announced his 
refusal to recognize any government instigated by Lenin and 
Trotsky (18:188)0 This attitude continued to be Francis' 
stand until his departure from Russia in 1918. 
Action by the Wilson Administration was hampered 
by conflicting reports and the lateness of Francis' cables 
because of poor telegraph connectionso Wilson wrote to 
Charles E. Russell agreeing with Russell's letter asking 
for United States propaganda to show that Russia's revolu-
tionary success depended on continuance of the war (1:349). 
Although the United States had little in common with 
communist Russia, Wilson would let Russia determine her 
own destiny in the hope that she would re-enter the war. 
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Much of the information received by the State 
Department concerning the latest Russian revolution came 
from Morris in Sweden; Francis wrote to Morris because of 
the difficulty sending information directly from Petrograd 
to Washington. Consequently, Morris was in a good posi-
tion to relay the new events, and he described in various 
cables to Lansing that the Bolsheviks had taken control of 
Petrograd and appeared to have the support of the Soviet. 
Immediately following the Bolshevik takeover, sev-
eral actions were taken by the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky 
proclaimed the Provisional Government dissolved, arrested 
some of its Ministers, and took a vote which indicated 
lack of confidence in Kerensky as a leader (64:861000/630). 
Later reports confirmed that the Bolsheviks had more con-
trol and there were more arrests of government personnel. 
The Mayor of Petrograd had formed a committee of public 
safety to oppose the Bolsheviks, which was supported by 
the American and British Embassies. Morris notified 
Lansing that Kerensky was willing to fight the Bolsheviks 
(64:861000/645). Finally, on November 19, Morris related 
the feeling of Russian visitors to Sweden that the Bol-
sheviks would not last long because of their lack of 
support from many socialist parties (44:237)0 
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Bolshevism was able to gain more popular support 
in November than earlier in 1917, because their plea for 
a separate peace was more appealing than in March. The 
sudden illusion of democracy in March added spirit to the 
war effort and the people seemed willing to fight for their 
newly won freedom. This spirit soon dwindled because war 
was just as devastating and cruel under democracy as it 
had been under Tsardom. Consequently the Bolshevik cry 
for "Bread, Land, Peace" became increasingly appealing to 
the Russian people. 
The move for a separate peace was strong in the 
earlier hours of the Bolshevik government. Francis was 
aware of this move and reported it to Lansing, when he 
wrote that a peace proposal was not a move for Russia 
alone, but for all Allies (44:236). The declining fight-
ing spirit of the army and their deplorable fighting 
conditions made any proposal for peace very popular with 
the soldiers. Francis was not concerned with this, but 
he was disturbed at the Russians for negotiating an armi-
stice without consulting the Allies; he reminded Russia 
she had promised to continue fighting, using all her abi-
lity (44:252)0 It is not difficult to understand Francis' 
displeasure with the Bolshevik peace move. He had worked 
hard to encourage the Provisional Government to stay in 
the war; to have a group of people, whom Francis never 
understood, dislodge that government and immediately call 
for an armistice was more than Francis could bearo 
Francis continued to display his intense dislike 
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of the Bolsheviks in his reportso Protection of the 
American Embassy was offered by the Bolshevik government, 
but Francis declined lest it indicate a form of recognition 
of the Lenin-Trotsky government (18:183). The popular rumor 
that Germany supported Lenin and his followers was accepted 
by Francis as well as by many State Department officials. 
Francis' beliefs were confirmed by German Secretary of 
State Kuhlmann on December 3, 19170 He stated that the 
Germans had in fact funded Bolshevik activity in Russia 
(4:1381). 
By the end of November, any hope of Kerensky's 
government returning to office had diminished considerably. 
The only hope left for Francis was that the remaining 
socialist parties would overcome the Bolsheviks and form 
a more moderate government. As a result, Francis watched 
the elections for the Constitutional Assembly with keen 
interest and told Lansing that it did not look like the 
Bolsheviks would win a majority. This was encouraging to 
Francis (44:272), and his speculation proved to be correct; 
nevertheless, the Bolsheviks powered their way to complete 
dominance of Russia in a short period of time. 
One final note remains to be explained concerning 
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David Francis' reaction to the Bolshevik takeover. When 
the Tsar fell in March and Prince Lvov formed a government, 
Francis eagerly requested State Department permission to 
recognize the new governmento However, upon seeing the 
Bolsheviks gain office, Francis was less willing to extend 
a friendly hand; he was reluctant to ask Lansing what he 
was to do concerning recognition of the Bolshevik govern-
ment. Lansing hurriedly cabled Francis that he was not to 
extend recognition to the Bolsheviks; he explained that 
the United States was waiting for further developments 
(44:254). When the wrong party acquires control of a 
government, it is understandable that the United States 
would hesitate to aid it with the prestige of her recog-
nition. 
To conclude State Department reaction to the 
November Revolution, a note from Maddin Summers in Moscow 
must be considered. Swnmers candidly described the deplor-
able conditions in the army, and said peace or no peace, 
the Russian army was not able to fight effectively. He 
concluded, however, that the most important American job 
was to combat German propaganda and hope the "better ele-
ments" in Russia would regain power. Thus, he felt it 
essential that all American agencies stay in Russia to 
aid the propaganda campaign (44:235). Summers, as well 
as most Americans, refused to give up hope that in the 
117 
near future the Bolshevik fantasy would disappear and sanity 
would once again rule Russia. 
Alexander Kerensky was critical of the Bolsheviks, 
not so much of the individuals, but of their unethical tac-
tics. Much of the Bolshevik agitation was directed at 
Kerensky personally; he thought this was damaging to the 
Provisional Government in the long run. The dual role 
played by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Govern-
ment for support of the people was unbalanced by the 
Bolsheviks' insistence on including the soldiers in the 
Soviet membership. This gave the Bolsheviks unwarranted 
influence in that body (30:233). The basically ignorant 
people of Russia were unable to distinguish between the 
Soviet and the government at times, thus severely damaging 
the government's authority and stability (30:233). 
Kerensky admitted that land reform was too slow in 
coming to realize support from the people, but he countered 
that none of the opposition offered a workable alternative 
to the government's program (30:225). Despite this and 
similar shortcomings, Kerensky insisted the Provisional 
Government could have succeeded if it had not been for the 
unethical and unfair lies spread by the Bolsheviks against 
the governmento Personal defamation toward himself con-
cerning the Kornilov Affair, Kerensky explained, proved to 
be "one of the major factors in the destruction of demo-
cracy in Russia" (30:423-24). 
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Generally, the public reaction to the Bolshevik 
takeover was similar to the State Department's; the people 
expressed disappointment at the Provisional Government's 
fall and opposed the Bolshevik government. Before Novem-
ber 7, the public seemed to be aware of trouble because 
many articles were written in the newspapers concerning 
Russia's ability to continue fighting in the waro The 
New York Times ran a front page story on November 3 repro-
ducing Lansing's letter to Francis describing the Washington 
Post's article about Russia quitting the war. The article 
made it quite emphatic that Russia was not out of the war. 
But in the same paper, an editorial criticized Kerensky's 
tacit statement about Russia withdrawing from the war before 
it actually happened (42:3rd/1)o 
Some Americans realized the overwhelming odds 
against the actual success of the Russian Revolution in 
developing Russia into a democracyo The blame, in part, 
was placed with the general backwardness of the Russian 
peasants. Simon Litman wrote that contrary to a few 
earlier claims, the Russians lacked a basic understanding 
of free choice on a national level, and the Russian masses 
followed the party that offered the most benefits in the 
shortest time. He claimed the Bolsheviks took advantage 
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of the poor internal conditions and the people were not to 
be blamed for following their lead; the freedom Russians 
sought was not to be criticized (34:181-91). Writing in 
1'.h£. Russian Review, Leo Pasvolsky described the Provisional 
Government as lacking real authority to guide the Russian 
people, and said the Kornilov Affair was the final blow 
before its downfall (45:7-38)0 
Criticism of the Provisional Goverrunent was not 
widespread; Kerensky himself received the brunt of the cri-
tics' blows. One comment from ~ Nation on November 8 
should be notedo It censured the Allies for not reducing 
their war aims, and commented that because the Allies 
refused to cooperate with Kerensky's goverrunent in his 
pledge to change the war aims, it greatly weakened his 
government (73:501-2). By the time The Nation hit the 
newsstands, their fears were reality--Kerensky's govern-
ment had fallen because the people lost faith in its 
ability to carry out its promises. 
Russian Ambassador Boris Bakhmeteff was not sympa-
thetic to the Bolshevik governmento Understandably, he 
would not represent them because of divergent viewpointso 
Bakhmeteff said that the American State Department would 
not recognize Lenin's government and would instead continue 
to recognize himself (42:25th/2), as he perpetrated the 
Russian attitude of continued fighting against Germany. 
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When news of the Bolshevik Revolution reached the 
United States, there was immediate response on Wall Street; 
the market dipped eleven points in some areaso It was one 
of the year's worst declines (42:9th/1)o Because Allied 
war contracts were a great factor in the stability of the 
Stock Market, it was highly susceptible to any unrest 
among the Allies; the Bolshevik Revolution caused the mar-
ket to drop. 
United States newspaper reaction at first was 
limited to descriptions of the Bolshevik takeover and 
Kerensky's attempt to wrestle control of the government. 
Many of the articles criticized the Bolsheviks but they 
did not laud Kerensky's former governmento Disruptive 
activity in Petrograd filled most of the early articles 
with comments about the Bolsheviks' irresponsibility in 
using power. 
Much of the public reaction to the second Russian 
Revolution was anti-Bolshevik. The people disliked the 
Bolsheviks mainly because they caused Russia to drop out 
of the war and forced America to accept a larger share of 
the fighting. Two years later, in 1919, the American 
people developed an equal hatred of the Bolshevik philo-
sophy. The label of pro-Germanism was pasted on the 
Bolsheviks; it was popular to lump all enemies of the 
Allies as pro-Germ.an. One can easily understand this 
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feeling that the Bolsheviks were aiding the Germans when the 
Americans could see more of their sons dying on the Western 
front because the Germans no longer had war on two fronts. 
Hope was expressed by many that a new government 
would emerge in Russia and topple the Bolsheviks. Leo 
Pasvolsky, editor of Russkoye Slovo, a New York daily, said 
that the Bolshevik rebellion was treasonous; it would 
shortly be crushed and replaced by a government pledged to 
convening the Constitutional Assembly (42:9th/2). Little 
doubt was left that the United States would recognize any 
government established in opposition to the Bolsheviks. 
Jews expressed open dislike of the Bolsheviks; the 
Bolsheviks had overthrown the only Russian government to 
even mouth equality for the Russian Jew, and it was only 
natural that the Jews would not favor the Bolsheviks. 
Herman Bernstein was emphatic that the Jews were not in 
sympathy with the Bolsheviks in a speech before the Insti-
tutional Synagogue (42:19th/2). 
Not all Americans viewed the Bolsheviks in the same 
light; most were opposed to them, but there were a few that 
did not view their new government as such a grave threat to 
American democracy. The American people were slow to rea-
lize the actual threat that Bolshevism presented to Germany, 
related William B. Thompson. He insisted the Bolsheviks 
represented the antithesis of Germanism and therefore were 
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an overpowering threat to the Germans (13:1408-10). Others 
felt that the Bolsheviks did not maintain enough control 
of the government to impose an immediate peace as they had 
threatened. The communists did not speak for the Russian 
people, said the~ York World (2:10). Charles Johnston 
backed this last argument when he wrote in the North Ameri-
£.fil:! Review that the Duma represented all Russians, whereas 
the Bolsheviks did not (24:378-87). Anti-socialism and 
pro-right wing political philosophy were consistent think-
ing by Johnston. 
Optimism ran high in the early days following the 
November Revolution that the Bolsheviks would soon fall 
and be replaced by some form of democratic government. A 
New X2.!:k Times editorial left no doubt that the Bolsheviks 
would not be able to retain power in Russia (42:11th/E-2). 
American officials expressed the same view; among these 
were s. R. Bertron, former member of the Root Mission, and 
Senator Meyer London. President Wilson saw the new Russian 
situation as a temporary setback in the war effort, but 
continued to believe that Russia would soon return to 
assisting the Allies (42:12th/3). The newspapers and peri-
odicals were literally weighed down with optimistic articles 
concerning the return of a democratic government to Russia. 
In all fairness, it must be said that not all shared 
this hope. One example is George Kennan, who did not 
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sympathize with the Bolsheviks at all, but took the more 
realistic view that European Russia was lost to the Allies 
and it was now necessary to save Siberia from the same 
fate. He contended that when fighting for Siberia, the 
.Allies must support the majority of the Russians and not 
the Bolsheviks (27:141). 
Alexander Kerensky was the last leader of the Pro-
visional Government and consequently received the majority 
of the blame for its failure. The Atlantic Monthly called 
him a "virtual dictator" just before the Bolshevik takeover, 
but concluded that the people were willing to follow his 
lead (78:693-703). Kerensky's image deteriorated the more 
time elapsed after the November Revolution. Many people 
heaped total blame on Kerensky's shoulders for Russia's 
failure in their only experiment with democracy. The most 
common charge against him was his temporizing with the 
Bolshevik problem. The New York Times accused Kerensky of 
trying to please everyone and allowing the Bolsheviks to 
gain strength (42:10th/12). Correspondents Julius West and 
Harold Williams, traveling in Russia during November, related 
that they did not hear a kind word about Kerensky from the 
people (42:18th/2;74:250-51). By November 18, a~ York 
Times editorial stated that Kerensky's attempt to raise an 
army was unsuccessful because the people had lost all faith 
in him (42:18th/E-2). The disenchantment with Kerensky 
continued to grow, people became bitter toward him; his 
failure meant that more Americans would die in Europe and 
he received the indirect blame. His name was finally 
linked with Bolshevism when the Times referred to his 
political philosophy as Kerenskyism in the same sentence 
as Bolshevism (42:20th/12). 
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Kerensky never did, in the first few months after 
November, 1917, gain back the confidence of the Russians or 
Americans he once commanded. It was not uncommon to see 
articles written six months after his fall blaming him for 
not demonstrating a stronger will when confronted by the 
Bolshevik threat, although as time progressed this criti-
cism became less harsh and more understanding. There was 
no difference between Kerensky and the Bolsheviks, com-
mented the New Republic, except that Kerensky was loyal to 
the Allies whereas the Bolsheviks were noto The article 
went on to chastise the western Allies for not understand-
ing the differences between the Russian moderates and 
extremists, concluding that a change had been necessary if 
they had wanted Russia to stay in the war (3:335-38)0 The 
~ Republic displayed this more understanding analysis of 
Kerensky, but the search for a stronger conservative leader 
continued. 
The primary concern of the United States upon 
hearing of the Provisional Government's fall was whether 
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or not Russia would remain in the waro Separate peace was 
a very unpopular idea among Americans because they thought 
it would increase fighting on the Western front. President 
Wilson was against a separate peace and admonished the 
pacifists. "I want peace," he explained, "but I know how 
to get it, and they do not" (42:13th/1)o Many Americans 
were critical of the Bolshevik bid for a separate peace, 
claiming they did not represent the true feelings of the 
Russian people. Lincoln J. Steffens, after touring Russia, 
concluded that a separate peace could not be realized 
because the Russian people did not want it, and they were 
the real leaders of Russia (42:10th/2). Nothing could have 
been farther from the truth. Henry P. Davison of the Red 
Cross agreed with Mr. Steffens that the masses were not 
desirous of a separate peace (42:9th/2). 
Testimonials continued to ring in the air with hope 
and trust in Russia; few news media carried articles that 
stated otherwise. The United States wanted Russia to con-
tinue to oppose Germany; it was an easy thing to believe 
they would, despite the indications they would not. Wil-
sonian ideals were so paramount for saving the world for 
democracy that the American public was temporarily unable 
to tolerate any opposition, especially by the little known 
and arrogant Bolsheviks. 
EPILOGUE 
Since 1900, the United States has developed into an 
omnipotent international force; when she makes a foreign 
policy decision, the entire world is affected. Sometimes 
the United States uses this power in a careless and even 
selfish manner. United States relations with the Russian 
Provisional Government of 1917 was such a case. President 
Woodrow Wilson decided to fight Germany, hoping to change 
European imperialism to a more liberal form of international 
order, but instead unintentionally aided the Bolsheviks in 
taking over control of the Russian governmento 
After the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, Russia 
was thrown into war and faced with having to establish a 
new form of government. The Russian people were not 
accustomed to representative government, and frequently 
reduced themselves to mob rule. Politics and political 
parties were able, for the first time, to operate without 
fear of government reprisal; thus confusion resulted as 
hundreds of years of political censorship were erased. 
The Russian political picture did not tell the 
whole story. Russia was involved in a war against Germany, 
Europe's strongest military machine; the ill-equipped Rus-
sian army was no match for the German armyo The Allied 
powers encouraged Russia to remain in the war, and at times 
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even threatened to curtail economic aid if Russia did not 
fight. The Allies were more interested in keeping Germany 
at war on two fronts than they were in helping Russia 
develop her first representative government. In all fair-
ness to the Allies, diplomacy of war takes precedent over 
everything during wartime. 
Russia's task of developing her first representa-
tive government and waging war at the same time were in 
direct contrast. In order to successfully conduct a war, 
a country must be internally stable; the Provisional Gov-
ernment was not. Failure of Kerensky's offensive in early 
July, coupled with procrastination in convening the Consti-
tutional Assembly and implementing land reform pushed the 
people to the point of rebellion. Following the attempted 
coup in July by the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government 
eroded with each crisis" The Kornilov Affair left the 
government standing almost alone while the Bolsheviks were 
preparing for the November Revolution. 
United States-Russian day-to-day diplomatic relations 
were generally formulated by David R. Francis, Ambassador to 
Petrograd. There were numerous other American representa-
tives to Russia during 1917, but only Francis wrote what 
the Wilson Administration wanted to hear. Being the first 
Allied representative to recognize the new Provisional 
Government, Francis felt an obligation to support this 
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government. His dislike of socialists and his hatred of 
the Bolsheviks prevented Francis from being an effective 
reporter to the United States Department of State. His 
dispatches to Robert Lansing were filled with confidence in 
the Provisional Government and distrust of the Bolsheviks. 
A variety of United States special missions were 
sent to Russia in 19170 The accomplishments of the missions 
were negligible during the time of the Provisional Govern-
ment; however, the Stevens Railroad Commission was of some 
assistance after the Bolsheviks gained power. The Root 
Mission, the most well known of the missions, came back to 
the United States with their opinions of Russia basically 
unchanged, and with weak suggestions for correcting Russia's 
ills. The two leaders of the Red Cross Mission, William 
Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins, interfered in Russian 
political matters, and kept that Mission from performing 
its intended dutieso 
International political philosophy played a major 
role in United States-Russian relations during 19170 Pre-
sident Wilson developed a world philosophy that eventually 
proved to be in direct opposition to Vladimir Lenin's world 
revolutionary philosophyo Wilson had faith in the basic 
capitalist system, and was willing to fight Germany to save 
it. Germany was not an enemy of the United States; rather, 
she was imperialistic, and Wilson wanted to eliminate this 
imperialistic element from Germanyo On the other hand, 
Lenin opposed waging war to save capitalism, but favored 
immediate socialist revolution to destroy capitalism. 
Lenin was concerned that the Allies, if successful in the 
war, would replace the socialists in world reform. 
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Philosophical differences between Wilson and Lenin 
markedly affected Russia. Wilson's insistence that the 
defeat of Germany be the first priority left Russia in a 
precarious position. Following the March Revolution, 
Russia's feelings toward the war were mixed, but as the 
months passed, the hardships grew more intense and the 
mood quickly changed. Opposition to the war and impatience 
with the slow progress of the revolution became the general 
attitude of the Russian people. Lenin's alternative philo-
sophy of abandoning the war for more expanded and rapid 
revolutions was appealing to the Russian people by late 
1917. The insistence by Kerensky and Wilson that the war 
be concluded before political reform be accomplished was in 
direct opposition to the progress of the March Revolution. 
By November, the Russian people developed the feeling that 
the revolution was more important than the war; this mood 
was synonymous with Bolshevik propaganda and consequently 
helped instigate the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Following the November Revolution, Bolshevism 
became an anathema in the United States, as was evidenced 
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by the Red Scare of 19190 Nevertheless, the United States 
was less hostile to Bolshevik Russia during the Versailles 
Peace Conference than was Britain or France. President 
Wilson believed the Russian people should determine their 
own fate; therefore, he was hesitant to assist the Russian 
nationalists in opposition to the Bolsheviks. Wilson's 
political philosophy, and in turn, United States-Russian 
relations, unintentionally assisted the Bolsheviks in 
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